Primary Source: Federalist 51, February 8, 1788 

 Objectives:

• I can explain why James Madison believed that the Constitution set up a limited government that shared power among its branches.  
• I can develop an argument using evidence from primary sources.  

Building Context: While the Constitution was signed in September 1787, it would need to be ratified by conventions of nine of the 13 states. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote and published The Federalist Papers in New York newspapers. New York was a state whose ratification of the Constitution was critical due to its size and location. In Federalist #51, James Madison outlined how the Constitution would effectively divide power in the new republic. He also continues to develop the argument he made in Federalist #10 about a large republic negating the danger of factions. 

For additional background information on Federalist 51, watch this following Primary Source Essential Video.

 

Text	In my own words
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government…it is evident that each department should have a will of its own…	Each branch of government should have certain powers of its own to keep power separated and to prevent each branch from overreaching its powers.
…members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others…But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments (intrusions) of the others…
…If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself…
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted (divided) to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure…
[Under the Constitution] the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority…
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society (community groups and associations not associated with government). It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction (party or group) can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy (chaos) may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger…

 

Comprehension and Analysis Questions

• What does Madison believe will be the best way to prevent power in the government from consolidating or becoming more powerful? 
• Refer to the Separation of Powers Infographic. List two examples of checks and balances in the Constitution that are intended to prevent a consolidation of power. 
• How does Madison think the proposed constitution will prevent a majority of citizens from joining together to violate the rights of minority groups? 
• Madison wrote, “Justice is the end of government.” Explain why preventing a consolidation of power in government helps ensure that justice will be better carried out in a society. 
• Summarize the main idea of this document in one sentence.  

Primary Source: Federalist 70, March 15, 1788

 Objectives:

• I can explain why Alexander Hamilton believed that a strong executive was necessary in the new Constitution.  
• I can develop an argument using evidence from primary sources.  

Building Context: Because of the experience of tyranny under the British monarch, the American revolutionaries feared strong executives in the states or at the national level during the 1770s and 1780s. The Articles of Confederation lacked an independent national executive. Because of this, the national government could not respond to crises such as Shays’s Rebellion, compel the states to follow the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783, or generally enforce congressional laws over such things as taxation. The Constitution created a single executive with broad powers. Anti-Federalists argued that the stronger executive would become tyrannical and corrupt, and therefore, endanger liberty. In Federalist #70, Alexander Hamilton defends the strong executive in the proposed Constitution. Hamilton argued that a single executive would be more effective than a plural executive in executing the law and protecting liberty.  

For more background information on Federalist #70, watch this Primary Source Essentials video. 

Text	In my own words
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government…Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises (attempts at attack) and assaults of ambition, of faction (party or group), and of anarchy (chaos)…	A strong or energetic executive is essential for the government to work well. Without it, there would be anarchy.
…A feeble (weak) Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

 

Comprehension and Analysis Questions

• What are the benefits of a strong executive, according to Hamilton? Do you agree or disagree? Why?  
• Why does Hamilton argue that an energetic executive protects liberty more than a weak one?   
• What are the dangers of an executive made up of two or more people? 
• How might an Anti-Federalist like Brutus respond to Hamilton’s argument for a strong executive?  

 

Primary Source: Federalist 78, May 28, 1788

Objectives: 

• I can explain why Alexander Hamilton believed that an independent judiciary was important in the new government.   
• I can explain the power of “judicial review.”   
• I can develop an argument using evidence from primary sources.  

Building Context: The Articles of Confederation lacked an independent national judiciary. In Federalist #78, Alexander Hamilton argues for the complete independence of the courts and the importance of judicial review. He explained that the judiciary would be the weakest of the three branches of government because it did not have power to enforce its will like the president or the power to make laws or spend money like the Congress. Instead, the judiciary had the force of its judgments in cases brought before it.   

For more background information on Federalist 78, watch this Primary Source Essentials video. 

Text	In my own words
WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government.  …Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.	The judicial branch is the least dangerous branch of government because it cannot act in the way that the other two branches can (make laws, enforce laws). It can only make judgements.
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy (effectiveness) of its judgments.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province (responsibility) of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain (figure out) its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two…the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former…
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks (defenses) of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure (time in office) of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous (difficult) a duty.

Comprehension and Analysis Questions

• Why does Hamilton argue that the judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch of government? 
• Why does Hamilton argue that judges must be appointed for life? 
• How does the judiciary, as described by Hamilton, enable a system of limited government?  
• Why does Hamilton argue that the judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch of government? Do you agree with Hamilton’s argument? 
• How does the judiciary reinforce the constitutional principles of checks and balances and limited government?