Federalist #62

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The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages…

 Senators need to be older and have a longer citizenship period than members of the House of Representatives. This is because senators need to have greater knowledge and be of more stable character and experience than members of the House.

It is equally unnecessary to dilate on (discuss) the appointment of senators by the State legislatures…It is recommended by the…advantage of…giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.

Allowing state legislatures to appoint senators will allow state governments to have a level of control over the federal government.

Note: The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, changed the election process for senators. Senators are now elected by the people directly, and not by state legislatures.

The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions (claims) of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic (where states and the national government share power), partaking (joining) both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation…

Giving each state the same number of senators, regardless of population, was a compromise. In a republic that gives powers to both the national and state governments, it makes sense to have some part of the national government be given proportional representation based on population (the House of Representatives and the Electoral College) and some part of it founded on equal representation (the Senate).

A government founded on principles more consonant to (in line with) the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless (pointless) anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty (power) remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty (remaining power)…

 The small states will not agree to a government that gives full proportional power to the large states. Therefore, the new Constitution is practical and creates a system that gives a fair amount of power to the small states but is still better than the alternative of a system that has no basis in proportional representation. Rather than focusing on all the negatives of this system, we should focus on the advantages that justify allowing the Senate to be based on equal representation.

It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary (beneficial) check on the government…

 Even in a republic, officials in the government can forget their obligations to those who elected them. Because this may happen and the government can abuse its power, it is good that the legislative branch is divided into two houses (the House and the Senate).