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Federalist 10 Scaffolded

Why did the Framers believe a large republic would create a stable and lasting government that protected against the violence of faction?

Federalist #10, November 22, 1787 Scaffolded 

 

  • I can explain why James Madison believed a large republic would create a stable and lasting government that protected against the dangers of faction.  
  • I can develop an argument using evidence from primary sources. 

Building Context: After the Constitution was signed in Philadelphia in September 1787, a vigorous debate over its ratification began. Supporters of the new Constitution were known as Federalists. Anti-Federalists were opposed to the proposed Constitution because they feared it would centralize power and individual rights. In order to help convince their fellow Americans of their view that the Constitution would protect freedom, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote a series of essays in defense of the Constitution. The essays appeared in newspapers addressed to the people of New York and were signed with names that referenced famous statesmen in antiquity. In Federalist #10, James Madison, writing under the name Publius, explained why the Framers believed the new Constitution would create a stable and lasting form of government.  

Use a highlighter to help you find the answers to the comprehension questions for each section of the text.  

For a summary of key ideas in Federalist #10, watch the following Primary Source Essentials video: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/videos/federalist-10-bris-primary-source-essentials  

Text  Vocabulary  Comprehension Questions 
To the People of the State of New York: 

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction… 

 
  1. What is the most important action a well-constructed Union should take? 
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.  actuated: motivated  

adversed: opposed to 

aggregate: combined 

  1. How does Madison define faction? In your own words, how would you define faction? 
…The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man… The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.  latent: inevitable  
  1. Why is faction inevitable? How can the Union address it?  

 

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union. The two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.  efficacy: effectiveness  

delegation: handing over (of power), entrusting with power 

discern: figure out 

consonant: in agreement with  

 

  1. What form of government will help control the effects of factions?  

 

 

  1. How is a republic different from a pure democracy?  

 

 

  1. How do representatives in a republic better protect against faction? 
In the first place… if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.    
  1. How does Madison think the size of a large republic protects against faction?  
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.  Suffrages: votes 

 

  1. What additional benefit  does Madison think a large republic offers against faction?  
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; …The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;…   
  1. What additional benefit does a large republic made up of more citizens offer in protecting against faction?  
Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic…is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. 

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states:… 

In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. 

conflagration: large fire 
  1. How does the size of the country help protect against faction?  

 

Analysis Questions 

 

  1. Madison wrote Federalist #10 as a response to the Anti-Federalist argument in Brutus 1. What was Brutus’ main argument against the Constitution? How does Madison reply to this argument?  
  1. Which argument do you find more convincing? Explain.  

 

For a longer, annotated version of Federalist #10, click here: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/activities/federalist-no-10-excerpts-annotated  

 

For more historical background on the ratification debate, click here:  

https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-ratification-debate-on-the-constitution