Public Good & Individual Rights: Federalist 10 Explained *Part 2* | A Primary Source Close Read

0:03 Hello and welcome back to another Bill of Rights Institute primary Source Close Read. This is part two of checking out Federalist 10, one of the 85 Federalist Papers written between August of 1787. and August of 1788, when the Federalists were arguing in favor of ratification of the new Constitution.

0:24 So in the part one we looked at what were the causes of factions, why is it that they’re a part of popular governments and what does it mean that they are sown in the nature of man? And in part two, we’re going to take a look at what Publius’ solution is to that problem or what he argues that the Constitution does

0:45 to try to fix those problems that factions cause. So let’s check it out. So now we’re back in Federalist 10 and we’re going to look at what it is that Publius says the Constitution, the new Constitution, does to ameliorate or get rid of this problem of faction or not get rid of it, in his words, control its effects.

1:05 So how are we going to control the effects of faction? So what is it that this new Constitution does? Again, keeping in mind that this new Constitution is being put forward as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation. The Art of Confederation had gotten the United States through the American Revolution, but it was starting to sort of be the challenges were arising,

1:28 not least which brought about by different factions that had interests in particular different states that were competing with other states. This new Constitution is hoping to come forward and deal with some of those issues and there are concerns about that because this new Constitution represents a much greater centralization of power at the national level than did the Articles of Confederation.

1:51 So one of the concerns is whether or not that centralization of power is going to threaten the rights of individuals within the states. And so Publius says this: to secure the public good and private rights against the dangers of such a faction and at the same time preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great object which our

2:11 inquiries are directed to which our inquiries are directed. In other words, protecting the public good and the private rights of individuals are what we need to do in a government. Sometimes that public good and those private rights are in tension with one another, they’re not always aligned. We just talked about that in part one where we were looking at different interests and things that are represented

2:31 by individuals is acknowledging that but also saying doing both of those things is why it is that we need to have a government in the first place in ensuring that a single faction, say at the time it may have been that the large states were going to get rid of or trample over the interests of the small states. We need to prevent that from happening, promote the good for all and to protect

2:53 the private rights of all these individuals. He goes on to use these two big words. He says, Let me add that the desiratum by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the long or private under which it has long labored can be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. So he’s saying that this is the great problem that all popular governments have suffered under and it’s absolutely

3:17 necessary, if we’re going to recommend a new form of popular government to function, that we need to solve this problem of factions. We need to solve this problem that has often come up and sort of torn things apart. So I’ve included here an image of the Senate from 1855 and this is Henry Clay standing in front of the Senate giving his famous oration.

3:39 Henry Clay is known as the Great Compromise because there’s a role in both the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 and other pieces of legislation. The idea being that particularly during that time in sort of the leading up to the Civil War there was this big question about how is it that we can work together to work towards national goals?

4:01 Sometimes that has pitfalls, that has shown to be challenging. But what Pool Voice is arguing for is look, in this new national government we’ll be able to create something that allows for that kind of compromise to be put forward. Whether that’s a good compromise or bad compromise is a conversation for another day. But what Publius is saying is this new Constitution will allow us to have

4:24 individuals, politicians elected that will help us to work towards coming to solutions that will serve the common good of the greater part of the nation. Hopefully that’s the argument. So Publius goes on to say this how do we do that? How does this constitution do that? If that’s the goal, trying to promote the public good and protect these private rights, how is it that we’re going to go about trying to make that happen?

4:46 And he says, evidently by one or two only. So how is this available? Either the existence of the same passions or interests in the majority at the same time. So we get everybody around and focus on something at the same time or the majority having such a coexistent passion or interest must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to CONSERT and carry into effect schemes of oppression.

5:07 In other words, we have to prevent them from coming to have the same opinions or we have to somehow control by the number of people that are involved. There’s become so many people involved they can’t come to this single scheme of oppression that’s going to trample on the rights of other people. He says, from this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy

5:31 can admit of no cure for the mischief of factions. In other words, a pure democracy isn’t going to be able to control these things, right? Because in a pure democracy you’re going to have a small group of people who are directly voting on their own interests. They themselves have their own interests represented and they are speaking on behalf of somebody else. What that results in and they would argue

5:51 this from sort of looking at ancient history and looking at different examples of democracy that come up, whether it was the Athenians or others. They’re saying that passion always rules in a democracy. When you get a group of people together, their passions are going to be the thing that comes forward. So that’s not a solution. So what is the solution? A republic by which here is defining what he means.

6:12 By republic he means a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking. So pure democracy is all the individuals voted themselves for the republic. You have this scheme of representation meaning that you have individuals voting for other individuals to represent their interests. Well, how is that a solution to what we’re talking about?

6:36 So he says, again I’ve got the definition of here what it means to republic, but he says that what this does is it refines and enlarges public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens. So what do you mean here? It means that by having individuals who elect other individuals,

7:00 you essentially have now a single individual representing multiple views. And so then that relies on their wisdom to discern the true interest of their country. Right? So I have interests, my colleagues at the Right Institute may have interests when we vote for an individual. What results from that is that I now as a representative

7:25 and possessing all of these things and I have to use my wisdom to then determine what is going to be the greatest good for the greatest number of people. And the hope is that their love of patriotism and their love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary partial considerations. In other words, I now have this big interest that I’m trying to represent all of these different individuals.

7:45 I’m going to use my own wisdom, guided by justice and my love of my country, to try to make the best decision possible. Now, is that idealistic? Maybe Pooly is here is looking sort of like again for that statement which he said won’t always be in control, but what he’s saying here is that the hope is that this will take place. And in another part of the paper,

8:06 which I haven’t included even says, look, there are limits to what this can do. But the idea is if we can try to get these people in place and we’re sort of filtering these views through, we’ve got a greater opportunity. So the question resulting then if we think republics can solve this problem, which most did. There were arguments in the Federal Papers about whether or not the new constitution represents the republic.

8:28 They made that case. Yes, it does represent a republic. Most were in agreement that republics do do this. Here he’s appealing sort of to the people who want a republican form of government. He said the question resulting is whether or not small or expensive republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public wheel and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter.

8:48 So our states or is the national government can be better at doing this or a stronger national government? All he’s meaning about public wheel is the public good, what is best for the most amount of people? And he says clearly it’s going to be where the most amount of people involved, this extended republic. So we’re talking about we’ve refined our views and now if we refine those views,

9:12 what is going to be better for refining those views? Is it a small concentrated number of people in a small republic or is it going to be larger? Because there’s many questions that have been raised about whether or not you could have this sort of large republic calls an extended republic. It’s part of the new constitutional scheme. So he says it’s this big one. So how do we know? What’s his argument for saying this?

9:32 He says clearly, let’s see what he means by clearly. So again, the question resulting is this extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal. It is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations. One of those considerations says, look, that if the portion of fit characters be not less in large than small.

9:55 He says that consequently we’ve got a greater probability. Right? In other words, there’s just more people in an extended republic. Great, we’ve got more people. The odds of us choosing something that’s going to be good or greater, that’s positive. He also says each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens. It will be more difficult for unworthy

10:17 candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, right? So when you get a bunch of people, it’s a lot harder to convince a bunch of people with something that’s bad than it is to convince one or two people. So bigger republic, we’ve got more odds that we’re going to find something that’s good and we’ve got more people represented. Meaning that more people can hold these elected officials accountable and keep

10:39 them from practicing these vicious arts, right? These are going to be arts of deception or they’re going to be trying to pull the wool over people’s eyes. So the idea is that we get a bunch of people, they vote for these representatives. The more people that are voting, the more odds that we’re going to hold them accountable and the better it’s going to be. So this is again in favor of this new national constitution saying extend the Republic, getting more people involved, get more interest involved.

11:02 That is how you’re going to control the effects of faction. He goes on to say hence it clearly appears that the same advantage as a Republic has over our democracy. Meaning everybody agrees. His audience in New York at this time would have said look at Republic democracy. Saying here again that can control factions. So too a large instead of a small republic

11:24 is going to be best for controlling these things. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states but it will be unable to spread a general conflagration among the states in the extent and proper structure of the Union. Therefore, we behold a Republic remedy for the diseases most incident to the Republican government and according to the degree of pleasure

11:46 and pride we feel in being Republicans ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists, Federalists being those individuals who are in favor of this new national constitution. Now this is interesting because Publius is here to say look, we’re trying to tilt things in this favor. We’re trying to make sure that this new constitution that we’re establishing is going to keep this from happening.

12:09 And he’s saying look at the time, it’s going to be hard for all these different state interests to come together. Now we know being students of history that in the 1860s this is actually what happens. There is a faction of states who are united by an interest around enslavement of individuals that come together and do this and it does turn out to be something

12:30 that challenges the very fabric of the Union and it’s something that Abraham Lincoln is very attuned to trying to put aside this idea of faction in the lead up to the Civil War there are many attempts at compromise and trying to sort this out so we see this play out. And again, I would caution anyone to think that Publius is putting forward the absolute perfect solution here. But what he is is arguing and saying if

12:52 we’re going to control factions this is the best way to do it. This new constitutional system is going to put us in a position where this is controlled as much as possible in popular government. Because again, thinking back to part one, factions are going to arise. He’s not trying to get rid of them. What he is saying is if they’re going to be there, this is the best way to control them.

13:12 Back to our big question how does the structure of the federal system promote the common good? Well in a number of ways. So again back to our big question. How is it that the structure of our federal system, how does it promote the common good? In a number of ways police says, look, faction is inherent in popular governments, human beings, if you’re going to be at a popular government, meaning people are going

13:34 to share their opinions and reviews, factions are going to resolve. So what do we do? Well, we can’t remove the causes because removing the causes would be stamping out liberty and trying to give everybody the same opinions. It’s not going to happen. But what we can do is try to control its effects. Are we going to do that perfectly all the time? No, but the idea would be that this new constitution is going to help that happen. So how does it control the effects?

13:56 Well, we’ve got a republican form of government. We’re passing through our individual interests to people who are representing a broad set of all these interests, relying on their wisdom to be able to have conversations and discuss with other representatives about what the best possible solution is for the most amount of people. It’s going to be so that’s we’re entrusting those public guardians to represent our interests and to work

14:18 through wisdom, keeping in mind justice and their patriots in the love of the country in order to find those good solutions that are going to be best for most and then that’s going to be even better. So a republican government is good but when you extend that republic and so you cover even more interests, that’s going to be even better. So we have this filtering of ideas and we have this extending of the republic

14:39 and those are two things that are key to sort of Publius’ arguments for why this new constitution is going to function. And ultimately it comes down to us as the people. And throughout this Publius points to important things that it’s ultimately the people who are the guarantors of this succeeding. Sometimes this can be seen as sort of a mechanistic thing, right?

14:59 Like we’ve got this perfect structure and now all of sudden a it’s going to be perfect. But again, thinking about what happens in the Civil War, that’s a failure of public officials, their inability to come and get rid of enslavement and come to a national consensus to get rid of that evil in the country led to factions, led to different economic interests that could not come to a final

15:23 conclusion, a compromise that would have brought that about and so the country was rendered apart because they failed to do that. So that’s a failure of the individuals keeping in mind that it’s within the system. So the system needs people, the people need the system. Together they work to try to promote the public good and promote the public weal. So thank you all so much for joining me

15:45 for both these parts of Explaining Federalist 10. I hope you learned something and I hope that you’ll join us next time. If you have any topics or things that you want to see us explore, please reach out to us on Facebook or on Twitter or feel free to email the Bill of Rights Institute. We’re always looking for new ideas and would love to hear your feedback. So thank you, sir, so much and we’ll see you next time.