Balancing Ambition: Federalist 51 Explained *Part 1* | A Primary Source Close Read w/ BRI

0:00 Hello, and welcome back to the Bill of Rights Institute’s. Close Reads. Today I’m going to be taking a look at Federalist 51. I’m going to see if we can get it explained for you. Federalist 51 comes right at the center of the Federalist Papers, pretty close to it. There were 85 papers written between 1787 and 1788. Federalist 51 is one of those famous ones that we’ve all heard of, and maybe you’re here because you’re talking about it in class.

0:22 So without further ado, let’s take a look. So a central question to looking at this text today is, how does the structure of our federal system protect liberty? And really what we’re looking at is how is it that Publius argues that the federal system is going to protect liberty just by way of some context? Again, these Federalist Papers were all written

0:44 between 1787 and 1788 during what’s called the ratification debates. So in order for the constitution to become legal after the Philadelphia convention, it was necessary that 9 out of the 13 states ratified the new constitution. And by ratified, I’ve been assented to, it said, hey, this looks great. So in pursuit of that,

1:05 these essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to argue in favor of the new constitution, basically to lay out why it was designed the way it was designed, what it was their intention was going to do. And then towards the end, they began arguing with others who are writing against them, who were labeled Anti-Federalist.

1:25 But we’re really just a collection of different individuals who are concerned about the new, growing central government. And in it, they lay out across 85 papers this really strong argument. The whole book itself is really interesting and tightly constructed. There’s sort of a flow and rhythm to it, and going in order can help you better understand it. But we tend to pick out a couple of these favorites.

1:46 I think 10 and 51 are probably the ones that you most read, but 1 is really interesting. 84 is really interesting. 72, 62 there’s 74. There’s a whole bunch to go into. But today we’re going to look at 51, and 51 really is central to what’s going on. So it was published in February of 1788, and already I think 6 states had already ratified

2:10 the constitution at this point, so they needed 3 more to get to the 9. But really, these were being written in New York and were intended for New York audience because New York was one of the biggest states of the time in New York and Virginia were really the two states that the federalists really wanted to ratify the constitution in order for it to become really understood to be law.

2:30 So it was legal at nine, but everybody kind of understood that if New York and Virginia didn’t sign on board the two biggest states in the nation at that point, then it wouldn’t really wouldn’t be accepted in a way that would stand. So in Federalist 51, Publius, which is the pen name for Madison, Jay and Hamilton, is taking on this big question and this comes sort of right in the middle of where

2:54 they’re about to transition into talking about the legislature. And he says this right at the beginning the structure of the government must furnish the proper checks and balances between the different departments. All right, let’s unpack that a little bit. What are we actually talking about here? We’re talking about checks and balances, right? Something we’re probably all familiar with. And the question is how does the constitution maintain this idea of checks and balances?

3:17 It actually opens the paper itself with this question as to what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining and practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments as laid down in constitution? In other words, what confidence do we have that once we put this constitution in place, it’s going to maintain itself? How is it that we know

3:37 that the legislature isn’t going to become dominant? How is it that we know that the executive powers are just going to tramp everything else? And the question on the minds of many of the Anti-Federalists, how do we know that the central government isn’t going to come to dominate everything else in the country? So going forward, he wants to start out his argument by pointing out why this is an important thing, right?

3:58 So the separation of powers, what is significant about it? He says in order to lay a due foundation for the separate and distinct exercise of different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own and consequently should be so constituted that the members

4:18 of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the others. Of the members of the others. All right, it’s a mouthful. But what he’s really saying here is we all agree that the separation of powers is key to the preservation of liberty. So again, thinking back to our central question, how does the government structure preserve liberty? Well, here previous is arguing separation

4:40 of powers is something that is essential to that preservation. And so in order to have that separation of powers in the way that it is designed to the constitution, we need certain mechanisms that are going to allow for that to happen. And here Publius is saying that a great way to keep those separation of powers intact is to give each department its own agency, in other words, its own ability to act on its own accord.

5:03 And within that, that means not appointing the members of others. So the House of Representatives doesn’t get to choose who is in the Senate, the Senate doesn’t get to choose who is president and so on and so forth. This though, is the perfect practicable way of thinking about it, right? And Publius goes on, and I only have segments of the paper here so we’re not going to go into every nuance.

5:25 But he goes on to say, look, this is great in theory but in practice there are certain exceptions that we have to make that point out. The judicial branch, for example. We don’t necessarily want the judicial branch to be elected by the people. Why? Because it would make them too dependent upon them when they’re rendering decisions that ought to be just based on the law, right? So he makes a practical combination.

5:46 He does this with a few other branches too. So he says this is sort of the theoretical ideal that we’re going for. There’s this perfect independence that we’re keeping everything apart. But we know in practice it’s going to be a little bit different. And he goes on to say this and this is probably one of the most famous lines in this paper but the great security is a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists

6:07 in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motivations to resist encroachments of the others. In other words, there’s a couple of things that are interesting in that first line to me. First, gradual concentration of the center of the several powers, right? So it’s not as though it’s going to be immediate. And I think this is something that some of those who are opposed to the new

6:31 constitution were concerned about that even though we come out with this great idea, over time this is going to get eroded. And so that idea of sort of a gradual concentration or drifting, as other intellectuals have noted, it was really at the forefront. And he says that in order to avoid that sort of gradual concentration

6:53 you need to give to each of those who are in the different departments the necessary constitutional means of the authority, the power and the personal motivation. So here he’s saying it’s not enough just to give them the power to protect their own interests but they have to personally be vested in what’s going on. So this is the first kind of tip towards

7:13 human nature which we’re going to talk about again here in just a second. But this idea that it’s not just about how it is that we can create a governmental system that’s going to protect us but we also have to keep in mind the people who are populating that thing. We have to give them a personal interest in keeping that separated and in protecting the powers of the position they’ve been elected to.

7:33 So it goes on to say this ambition must be made to counteract the ambition. The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?

7:54 If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, either external or internal controls on government would be necessary. So this beautiful phrasing that Publius writes here in this case, Publius, is James Madison. But the way that he constructs this is to say, look, we have to understand that people are

8:19 ambitious or that ambition will be a part of what people are trying to accomplish, and that ambition is what drives the overreach of power. So that overreach of power, right, stepping outside of your design role needs to be put in conflict with other people who are doing it so that the tension between those things counteracts.

8:40 The interest must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. So the personal actions of that individual politician must be connected to his own role so that he has an interest in maintaining some of his position. He said it may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. In other words, look, we’re not designing this for the ideal person.

9:02 We’re not designing this for, say, the George Washington who is, in the eyes of many of the founders, this perfect epitome of courage and of civic virtue. But we’re instead designing it for the everyday person, which we all know at times will overreach and at times will fall short of their goals. At times, they will be imperfect.

9:24 And so, because that is massive, they’re reflecting on human nature, meaning we know this is going to happen, he says. He takes a step back. But what is government but the greatest reflections on all human nature? Of course we need this. It’s not bad that we’re taking into account that there’s not going to be perfect individuals occupying these offices.

9:44 It’s us understanding that in designing a government around that understanding of human nature. If men were angels, in other words, if men were perfect, we wouldn’t need government. We would all exist happily together, we would pursue justice and protect our liberties, and everything would be perfect. But we’re not. And so, because we’re not, we need both the external and internal controls on government, meaning the external being,

10:10 for example, the popular will of the people, ensuring that government is maintaining itself, and then, of course, internal, meaning these different checks and balances that are keeping together this system of government so it stays on track. So Publius goes on to talk about in framing this government, and he says, this is all great.

10:34 We’re now going to be framing the government. He says, in framing the government, which is to be administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this. You must first enable the government to control the government in the next place, obliged to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt a primary control on the government. But experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

10:55 So here again he is talking about this external dependence on the people and it’s that external dependence that is going to keep the government controlled. But we also need these auxiliary precautions, these internal controls in order to maintain the government moving in the direction that it’s going to be.

11:15 Because again, we’ve just reflected on human nature. We’ve acknowledged that man is not perfect and so he’s saying in framing government which is be administered by men over men, here he’s directly appealing to the argument just like, look, we know people aren’t perfect and those imperfect people are going to be ruling over other imperfect people. Ultimately the people need to be in control and we need to rely on them

11:36 and trust in them because that is the foundation of republican government that people can be trusted to govern themselves. But even though we will be trusting them, we also need these ongoing precautions to maintain it. So that’s the beginning of Federalist 51. We will be back next week to talk about the next section of Federalist 51 where Publius takes a little bit of a turn

11:59 and starts talking about not only the internal controls of the Constitution and how it’s constructed, but also how the federal system, meaning the relationship between the states and the federal central government itself, helps to maintain this balance and also acts as another control helping to maintain these governments. I hope you’ll join me again then.