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Anti-Federalist 11

Anti-Federalist XI, as Brutus, January 1788

Building Context: The main claim of this Anti-Federalist essay is how much power the independent federal judiciary is given in the proposed Constitution. Brutus argued the local and state judiciaries would lose authority, states would lose sovereignty, and lifetime appointments for judges would result in their lack of accountability. A consistent fear among Anti-Federalists of consolidated federal power was reintroduced as well. 

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It is, moreover, of great importance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications.  
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.  
The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal.  
The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: – I mean, an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted.