Reading the Marshall Plan Speech | A Primary Source Close Read w/ BRI

0:03 Hello and welcome to another Bill of Rights Institute Close Read. My name is Kirk Higgins and I am joined once again with my colleague Tony Williams. Kirk, how are you? I’m doing well, Tony. How about you? Great. So today we are at least when this is being recorded, we are close to the 75th anniversary of V-J Day, which is the formal end of the Second World War with the surrender of Japan.

0:26 And so we thought it would be good to take a time to kind of take a step past the end of World War Two and look at the Marshall Plan and what was going on in Europe in 1947. So let’s dive in and check it out. So the specific document that we’re looking at today is a speech that George Marshall gave at Harvard University on June 5, 1947.

0:52 So Tony, for those who don’t know, obviously George C. Marshall played a critical role as a general in the Second World War. But by June of 1947, he’s no longer a general. Right. He is now Secretary of State, I believe, for Harry Truman. Yes. So Marshall, of course, was FDR’s chief of staff.

1:17 He didn’t actually lead troops during World War Two. And I think that’s an important distinction for the students because he was really critical to FDR. FDR really relied upon him as an advisor, as the army’s leader in Washington. And after the war, he actually has this mission to China to try to go there and

1:42 help the Nationalists and help resolve their civil war. He doesn’t succeed in that, but then he is appointed Truman’s Secretary of State. And so that means he is in large part responsible for making a lot of the diplomatic foreign policy decisions

2:05 for the United States in consultation with the President and some other advisers. Right. In the big diplomatic issue in 1947 would have been sort of piecing back together the world order. Right. So things have been shattered because of the Second World War and in Europe in particular, where this speech and Marshall play were focused, sort of economic devastation,

2:27 material devastation, millions had been killed without exaggeration and billions had been lost in economic productivity, which continues to affect even those who had survived sort of that tragic, horrific violence that had taken place in Europe. And so I should note that we are using

2:48 the transcribed version of Marshall’s speech, which I think is really cool, especially if we’re talking about students, because it has sort of these informal remarks both at the beginning and the end. On this document we’ve italicized those. But I think it’s interesting because it shows a little bit of Marshall’s personality and also Marshall as the diplomat. Right. I guess maybe that’s a question for you, Tony.

3:09 And I don’t know this, but why give this as a speech? So Marshall is laying out a plan, but I guess what was that plan? And was this something that was being authorized by Congress? Was it just something that Marshall on his own, decided the United States needed to do? I guess. What are the constitutional things that work here?

3:30 And also, why is this coming out in a speech and not in some sort of legislation or something else? Okay, I’ll take this in order. Well, Europe was greatly suffering and several State Department officials who went over there saw the devastation and the number of displaced persons and the physical

3:54 destruction and just really even the malaise among the people, just kind of the sense of hopelessness people were starting literally. And so the members of the administration start to develop, especially in the State Department with Marshall leading the charge.

4:21 But then also figures like George Cannon being on a policy planning group along with some other officials started investigating the issue. And other members of the administration are tied to the administration like a diplomat named Dean Acheson. They start to give speeches and they start to kind of float the idea.

4:42 And I think this is what Marshall is doing for Truman. He’s really floating the idea to test the waters, see if there’s popular support or popular opposition. Don’t forget that the Republicans and Southern Democrats who are generally seen as more conservative, a little bit more isolationist,

5:06 in a sense, certain members would have been opposed to this. America had a number of problems at home, too, including post war demobilization and inflation. So there’s really a lot of issues going on here. And I think atchison speech a month or two

5:26 before this Marshall speech here and then later on, Truman’s formal proposal to Congress later on, a few months hence from this, is just kind of floating the idea out there politically. Yeah. And I think here on a personal note, I think it’s really interesting. I think my favorite line of this little

5:47 intro paragraph again, italicized because these were his informal remarks, him coming out and stating, I’m rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you have been generous enough to accord to me. I think it’s interesting to remember that this is a man who has been in the public spotlight now for nearly a decade in a very high ranking position.

6:12 Overall, his approval has been pretty high. And now here he’s taking on yet another challenge and one that’s politically fraught. Right. So it’s not as clear that this is necessarily the best thing in the American interest. He’s certainly making a case here, arguing that it is. But the humility here that he comes out with, I think isn’t faint. It comes across to me, anyway, as being genuine and being genuine

6:37 in the sense that and he addresses us later in the speech that he knows that he needs to convince the majority of the American people that this is the right thing to do in order to promote peace and stability around the world. I love that opening because he gets right to the point. He’s not overly verbose in the way that he says it, but he lays it out right here at the start of the speech.

6:59 Right. Yeah, I know. I think there’s a lot of humility here. He was a remarkably well respected figure in American society and I think he’s striking the right thing here, as you say, testing the waters in terms of the politically fraught issue of giving

7:21 billions and billions of dollars to Europeans. Right. That’s kind of the idea. Truman will propose about $17 billion in a few months and that’s an incredible figure. It’s a lot of money today. But think about back in 1947. It would be spread out over a few years, over four years, I believe.

7:43 But that’s about half of the national budget. So that would be like us talking about giving trillions of dollars away to help rebuild other countries. It’s not something that was necessarily really palatable to a lot of Americans. Many had accepted the idea of sort of American role in the world.

8:07 But that was still an evolving thing during the war and then after the war, this sort of internationalism as opposed to the pre war isolationism. Yeah. And I tried to look at budget numbers and I was unsuccessful in doing so before we got on the conversation. But I think it was 13 billion that Truman was asking for.

8:29 And I was trying to find what pre war spending looked like in the United States because I would guess that $13 billion for the federal government to spend that kind of money would have been a significant portion of the budget in pre war United States. Moving into the beginning of this argument here, I think this really resonated with me for students today, too,

8:49 that I think, for all of us as we’re exposed to more and more information. What Marshall says here is the enormous complexity of what’s going on, and I think it’s in this section. But that distance he either says here a little bit further on but the distance that we are from these events makes it so difficult for us to even comprehend what’s

9:12 going on or for the average individual citizen to understand both the complexities of everything that’s taking place but also just the ability to have the kind of empathy that you really need to make this kind of commitment to another person is difficult when they are halfway around the world from you and when the United States was largely unaffected

9:33 by the war in the way that Europe was affected by it. I agree. Pearl harbor changed. That right. It kind of shrunk the distances between the continents and showed Americans that they were at times vulnerable to attack and that distant events could affect us. Although, again, we largely escape the kind of war

9:56 damage on the continental US that was seen in Europe and really around the world. Yes. And I think what’s interesting it goes on to talk about here is that damage wasn’t just in the physical destruction of those nations but also in how those nations had to gear up or hadn’t geared up for the conflict itself.

10:20 And Nazi Germany in particular had shifted its entire economy to support its war machine. And there’s a lot of really good books on the Nazi economy itself if anyone’s interested. But just the idea that they had literally turned over everything for the purpose of waging war against the world had tremendous effects just on their ability to produce the goods that it needs

10:45 to survive and maintain the population that lived in Germany. Which I think is a really important context to give for students too because it’s not just about that destruction though that is a significant part of it but it’s also just this shift in resources that had taken place I think is significant as well.

11:06 Yeah, they thoroughly changed. They Nazi-fied it. Right. As well as geared for war. Everything was directed towards that. Sure. So even without sort of the level of physical destruction or even without the economic destruction that took place really in many ways throughout Europe,

11:29 even without all that it still would have been a significant challenge. And I think that’s what he’s alluding to. Yes. And not to mention though that it’s also Nazi Germany we’re talking about here. So this isn’t a nation that has done anything to make anyone want to do anything to help them. I mean they brought about this conflict,

11:52 they devastated their own native population but also Jewish and other ethnic minorities across Eastern Europe and into Western Europe and that’s who he’s talking about reaching out to. And I think two years after the United States had just fought a war, I think it’s important to keep in mind that we’re now turning around and trying

12:12 to help that country get back on its feet again which I think is interesting. This is interesting. Yeah. To go to war against imperial Japan and Nazi Germany left 40000 Americans dead, millions, tens of millions around the world and yet we helped them rebuild.

12:38 Right. It’s a really interesting concept. Right. It’s in many ways unprecedented. Right. Usually you take reparations from a defeated enemy, usually you punish them in some way. Right. But that experience in World War One and the Versailles Treaty had taught them the perils of that and that it could and did in fact lead to another war

13:01 and a lot of resentment and that led to the rise of Hitler and so forth. I think we see an attempt to integrate the world again economically so that political integration in Europe and establishing free institutions around

13:23 the world they believe that would then lead to greater chances for world peace. I don’t know if you agree with that logically would follow. What do you think? Yeah, I certainly understand it. Right. I mean it’s certainly understandable that he makes this shift.

13:46 And I think in the speech here, he’s really trying to make it about the individuals who are affected, which is a whole other interesting conversation, right? Like, who’s actually fighting these wars? Oftentimes it’s governments. The Nazi regime was deposed, but then there’s to what extent are the people of that nation complicit in that? I think it’s a complicated question, but here he’s trying to draw our attention

14:09 to the individual farmers, those individual citizens who are suffering because of just the horrific devastation taking place there. And I think the logic makes sense on the other side of it. And we’ll talk about this a little bit a few paragraphs down. But you can see from the other side, you can see the Soviet perspective

14:30 in France, too, of being concerned about a resurgence in Germany, right? I mean, this is the second war within as many generations that has devastated the continent of Europe by the same nation as the aggressor. And here we are helping them rebuild yet again. I think the statistic that sticks up my mind, I think, is that the Soviet Union

14:53 lost around 27 million soldiers or something to that effect. That is an incredible amount of loss of life for them to then turn around and say, oh, yeah, go ahead, help them get back on their feet. Right. Like you say france and Russia. We’re very concerned about the rebuilding of Germany and its resurgence because they believe that based upon their experience

15:18 with the Nazi regime, that once you stimulate their economy and get them going, they’re going to be able not just to produce civilian goods and farm goods, but weapons of war as well. And that very powerful. Germany, with a central state

15:41 guided towards war, would again have the capacity to tear down half of Europe. Yeah. And I think here in these two paragraphs, you’re seeing sort of the cycle that Marshall sees, right? I think he’s making the argument clearly that we live in an interconnected world

16:01 and for the markets of Europe to collapse in a way that’s that they literally can’t. The fabric of civil society is so broken that they cannot feed the cities, and the farmers can’t even support themselves because they can’t get the goods from the cities. That have happened. So, in essence, the modern economy has divided up labor in a way that now doesn’t allow it to rebuild unless there is some

16:25 kind of support economically to get that back off, back to the level that it was. It’s interesting because I think here he’s saying, like, the United States doesn’t have anywhere to send its goods if Europe collapses. So there’s a humanitarian thing of these individuals are suffering. We need to do something about it. And by the way,

16:46 it’s in the direct interest of America, because if we don’t do this, we’re not going to have a market into which to put our goods outside of ourselves, which we’re producing more than we can consume ourselves. So it’s interesting, maybe I don’t know. What do you think? Should he have stuck with a more humanitarian this sounds very pragmatic in these two paragraphs, unless humanitarian, I guess, is that problematic, or is that

17:11 just real politique and it’s just the way things are? Well, I think there are three goals, like you’re saying of this martial plan. That one is humanitarian relief. They’re suffering, but as you say, are Americans going to support it? Are they going to send billions

17:33 of dollars, half the national budget, over to Europe? And so I think he’s arguing the humanitarian, but he’s also going down into the argument that this is a matter not just of self interest, but of principles as well. Right. We can support if we support free societies, we support economic recovery

17:53 that’ll lead to free societies around the world. Free societies, probably more peaceful, don’t go to war with each other. So in a certain sense, logically, you’re supporting a more peaceful future without the scourge of world war. But of course, the third major goal in this is that the Soviet Union

18:16 is acting very aggressively in Europe and in Asia, around the world, and we have the beginnings of a cold war shaping up. And so while he says we’ll get to that, it’s not directed against any particular nation or ideology. His audience would have known that it was

18:37 in some ways directed against communism, directed against the appeal of communism, that these Europeans, while they were suffering, while they were distraught, while, you know, the world, the civilization had collapsed around them, that in their desperation,

18:58 they return to these ideologies such as communism or fascist. Right. But the particular concern here is communism. Yeah. And I think that’s great, and it gets a question I asked early on, which is why a speech? Right? And I think that’s the challenge that we face in a democratic society, right.

19:23 You can see what’s best, but convincing the rest of the nation that that’s what’s best, because there’s something inherently good in that democratic system, but it creates this challenge. Right. And that’s why he’s laying out this case. And he doesn’t seem to begrudge that. I mean, he even admits, look, I understand this is challenging that was the first paragraph, right? You’re at a distance.

19:44 It’s complex, I get it. There’s lots of other things. And it seems to be saying, look, I understand why you’re hesitant, but listen, this is why we need to do it. And I think this line was really powerful for me. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Right? Again, stripping away sort of that political veneer and saying, these are people.

20:06 We’re not talking about Nazi Germany. We’re barely talking about Germany. We’re talking about reviving, as he says, a working economy in the world as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. And so it’s essentially saying, look, put aside and he says this in a couple more paragraphs put aside the partisan

20:26 understand that we’re doing something to help other human beings. So that’s to avoid desperation and chaos, because that’s what he claims is the alternative. Of course, on the other side, I’m sure that there were those that were claiming that that might be a false dichotomy. But Marshall is certainly sitting there in a position saying, look,

20:47 there’s no way that this can be accomplished without us taking this dramatic step to intervene in Europe in the way that we are right now. I mean, this is where he lays out his logical syllogism, right, of economic recovery, protect free political institutions, promote world peace. He really lays it out

21:08 in that paragraph whether it is directed against another country. I think he’s fudging a bit, but I think he is sort of pushing the humanitarian angle very heavily there. I think it’s sincere, but I also think that this is part of the Cold War. But I think this paragraph is interesting

21:30 too, because he’s hitting at a contradiction that he knows is happening. Right. So it’s desperate that we get involved to establish free institutions, and yet we have to get involved in a way that does promote freedom. So it can’t be a way in which the United States isn’t going into rebuilding, but instead we’re funding the recovery of Europe, which is complicated.

21:51 Right. How do you foster that and how do you administer that from the United States standpoint? Just because you have the money to send it’s not as easy as just writing a check and saying, here you go. How do you ensure that the funds that you are sending for this cause are happening?

22:13 And I think there was an administration set up, is that right, Tony, that was specifically for administering just the funds for the Marshall Plan? Yeah, that’s correct. And they worked with the Europeans, as he says here, just to help them get on their feet. Europe, the Europeans had to draw up the plans, had to submit them to the United States.

22:35 There was some dialogue, some debate, some items were definitely taken off the list and it was really targeted towards what is really not only going to support your immediate needs, but it’s not just not just a handout, right?

22:56 I need to emphasize on that here. It’s not just relief, right, because that would could in theory just continue for a very long time. Rather this is about recovery, right? How are you going to target and the Europeans have to develop plans for sort of targeted so we’re going to support industry in this way

23:17 and banking and they could make loans to people to rebuild homes and farmers to plant food and to get a working economy in all these countries. So yeah, that was a very important part of the administration, to have the Europeans and Americans working together.

23:38 Yeah, and here we get to his conclusion, too, which gets back to the American people. And I thought it was interesting that says political passion and prejudice should have no part. When I read that, I was like, there’s got to be political debate though, right, and there’s people going to be passionate on both sides. But I wonder if he’s talking about just a sober reason with which you approach

24:00 and understand this plan and whether to back it. And here the audience doesn’t seem to be the American people as much as it is those in Congress or in some sort of representative position to say, look at the plan and assess it for whether or not you think it’s going to effectively deliver on the outcomes that we’re laying out.

24:25 That’s a powerful message. And of course, political passion and prejudice are words that have been used in the American context all the way back to the founding period. You see a lot in the Federalist Papers and I think that seems to be the thing to which he’s pointing that directly, speaking to sort of those parts of our government that are meant

24:48 to be reasonable, namely the Senate, I’m guessing, who’s responsible for treaties and diplomacy and that kind of a thing. Well, then there’s another side of this, too, right? The opponents who heard the speech or read it in the Washington Post or New York Times or what have you, I mean,

25:11 they might be a little angered by that, right? They might say, oh, so we’re the passionate ones, you’re the reasonable one, right? That’s not a very fair way to argue, right? We’re the prejudiced ones. We’re the ones who have to overcome this. So we can see the reason of your proposal because obviously you sort of have a monopoly on reason.

25:36 I don’t want to be too harsh on him. I also think it’s maybe a little naive. He’s not a politician and he was in the army for decades. He was politically suave in a certain sense because he dealt with a lot

26:00 of statesmen and a lot of different generals that he had a certain reign in and all their conflicts as well as working with allies and all of that. So he did have experience in DC. And with politics. But on the other hand. To say to the American people. To say to the opposing political party.

26:21 Which was at that time the Republicans with a few Southern Democratic allies. To say that this is just a reasonable thing to do and you should do it. And that there’s not going to be sort of partisanship and there’s not going to be sort of a vigorous debate over this. That’s what I think is just maybe a little

26:42 naive and there should be a vigorous political debate. Right? I mean, this was spending a tremendous amount of money, and this is something that just can’t be sort of willy nilly agreed to. So there are going to be there is going to be partisanship. There are going to be some passions. And I agree with you that we should have our reasons should guide us in our

27:04 political discussions more than our passions. But I just thought I throw it out there that Marshall maybe needs to give a little bit more credit to his political opponents and to the democratic process, as messy as it can be. Yeah. And I think that’s an important thing to highlight for students especially,

27:25 is you can notice where Marshall is laying out his rational argument, and you can see where he’s laying out his political argument, right? And I think here his informal conclusion. He gets back to that sort of political argument again, right? But I think he’s relying on his own, the trust that the public has placed in him over time, his own reputation,

27:46 to say, look, I think this is really important, and I’m someone you’ve trusted for a long time, so listen to me, it’s important. And again, he goes after those modes. But also, the reason I like highlighting this for students too, is he has those formal remarks, those he’s laying out for very specific diplomatic purpose.

28:09 But then he goes back and reiterates, I think, in his formal remarks here some of the things he touched on. He says, as I said more formally a minute ago, we are remote from this. It’s a long way away. It’s impossible at this distance merely by reading or listening or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation.

28:30 And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. And it hangs, I think, to a large extent, on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors? What are the reactions to people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done, what must be done?

28:50 And I think that’s a really powerful end. Again, it’s more political. It’s clearly him. But I’m a trusted public servant, and this, I think, is the most important thing that we can possibly be focusing on now on the diplomatic stage. And maybe it was. I think it’s easy for us in hindsight to look at what is now a prosperous, economically prosperous Europe and say,

29:14 well, clearly they were on the uptick, it was going to be okay. But even pre-war Germany, pre-war Germany was in trouble. It wasn’t the industrialized, modern nation that we think of it now. It’s sort of remarkable for Marshall to he’s asking for something significant, I think, when he’s saying, look,

29:37 invest now in order to secure peace in the long run. Right? I mean, that’s his argument. I think in the previous slide, there’s a really important line really going to the heart of American foreign policy that I really like to see what you think of. It says with foresight and with a willingness on the part of our

29:58 people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I’ve outlined can and will be overcome. I mean, does America have responsibility to rebuild Europe? Does it have responsibility for the world and for world peace?

30:20 How does that change with sort of its former, more isolationist view? Does America have these responsibilities? Yeah, I think it’s a really interesting question, and one I definitely think we should dive into again at more length, because to me, that line harkens to an idea that is very

30:44 much a part of American history, particularly on the diplomatic stage, which is there’s something about the United States that is different, right? Whether you call it exceptional, whether you call it something he’s pointing to, there’s something that the United States has a responsibility to do on the world stage. And now, after the Second World War, we find ourselves as the preeminent world

31:08 power, economically militarily alongside the Soviet Union, obviously being sort of our counter poison. That but there’s something about the United States specifically, I think, that he is harkening to. And I don’t know, I think it’s a complex question out of which a lot grows.

31:28 Right. This is the beginning of a different trajectory for American foreign policy going forward, and one, I think that the importance of which I don’t think can be understated. Right. When Mary and I talked on our series here about the Truman Doctrine recently, as well as Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, we raised similar questions what

31:52 are the purposes of American foreign policy? These are our questions that have kept coming up throughout our study of American history and I think really important questions for teachers to grapple with their students. I think that leads some very interesting conversation. Absolutely.

32:13 Well, thank you, Tony, and thank you, everyone, for tuning in, as always, if you have any suggestions for documents that you want to see us take on, please feel free to reach out to us on Facebook, on Twitter, and we’ll look forward to talking to you again next time.