Reading Andrew Jackson’s Veto of the National Bank | A Primary Source Close Read w/ BRI

0:05 Hi, this is Tony Williams of the Bill of Rights Institute, and I want to welcome you to another Close Read of a Primary Source. And for this one, we are very honored to have a friend of BRI and a magnificent scholar, Todd Estes. And Todd Estes is a professor of history at Oakland University and the author

0:27 of the J Treaty debate, several scholarly articles and also a forthcoming book on the ratification debate around the constitution. And he’s also won several teaching awards and as I said, a great friend BRI and a contributor

0:50 to our life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness textbook. I want to thank you for joining. Us. Tony, thanks so much. It’s always good to be with you. And I’m looking forward to our session this morning, so thank you. Great. Well, we’re doing a close read of Andrew Jackson’s veto message related to the national bank, and so this is a good one. So I’m looking forward to diving into it with you.

1:13 That’d be fun. Great. Well, let’s go ahead and get started, and I’ll share my screen in a second. And while I’m doing that, can you give a little background on Andrew Jackson, who was he and a little bit maybe about his presidency, maybe to set the scene for our viewers about why he might have vetoed the bank?

1:38 Sure. I think Andrew Jackson is one of the most fascinating characters in the period between the revolution and the civil war for all kinds of reasons. He was then, and certainly has remained since, deeply controversial for all kinds of reasons, based on actions he took or things he said or personal interactions that he had. And historical scholarship on him has been really pretty divided as well.

2:02 But Jackson, I think, in many ways was the great beneficiary of the battle of New Orleans in the war of 1812, which really moved him out of being just a general, if we can say that, from someone who had sort of a lifelong military career into someone who was going to be able to have now a political career as well. He became really a hero at a time when heroes were sort of becoming a new

2:28 cultural item, I think, in the United States. And all kinds of people became heroic or became famous for different sorts of things. And I think Jackson’s heroics at the battle of New Orleans and the decisive victory, as we know, after the war had already officially ended, nonetheless catapulted him into great fame and sometimes spoken of today.

2:50 The idea of the great mentioner begins to mention certain names as a possible candidate for high office. And I think after the war of 1812, jackson, though he was not done with his military service, obviously, and would go on to have some very controversial items in that military service yet to come in Florida. Nonetheless, Jackson was sort of catchable

3:11 to this national level of fame with the sort of statesmen and career politicians of that same era and time period. So Jackson’s rise to fame, I think, really obviously preceded and set up his presidency. And he and his followers saw him as this great representative figure coming out of the west. He’s from Tennessee. He was born in North Carolina.

3:34 He was a large landowner, though not overly wealthy. He was someone who had served in a variety of political offices in Tennessee. But he really sort of had that spark that it factor in some ways that made him really appealing to many. And he became the kind of political figure, as transformative politicians

3:54 often are, that you could sort of whoever you were, you could find something in Jackson to like or to admire, or you could find in him something that seemed to echo what voters or political figures themselves thought was important or significant. So there was a lot of stuff attached to Jackson, I think, and a lot of symbolic stuff loaded to his name.

4:15 And all this led, of course, in 1824 to Jackson being nominated for the presidency, putting himself forward for the nomination for the presidency. In the days when the political rules were very different, the caucus system hadn’t gone away yet, conventions really weren’t fully established yet, and you had this enormous five way race in 1824.

4:35 Jackson, of course, most famously coming out on top of both the popular vote and the electoral vote, but not having a clear majority of either. The election thrown to Congress, of course, in the so-called corrupt bargain. John Quincy Adams became president. Henry Clay was named later Secretary of State. And this enraged Jackson and his followers.

4:57 And I think in many ways before Jackson became president. I think you could argue that he ran. In a sense. Kind of the first of what we would today call a permanent campaign. Because I think really from the day he lost in the House of Representatives in 1825. Jackson and his followers spent four years nursing that grudge. Four years organizing.

5:19 Four years building an organization. Four years forming alliances in order to put him forward again in 1828 for a rematch with John Quincy Adams. And in that rematch, of course, Jackson won what remained for the entire 19th century, I think still maybe the greatest popular vote margin, the most decisive presidential election results in the 19th century,

5:43 aside from Monroe’s undefeated things earlier where he was really not contested. So that was a huge popular victory for Jackson in 1828. But I think in many ways, and this sets up a couple of things I think are relevant to our talk today, and that is that Jackson sort of spent four years where he thought he should have been president, running for president

6:04 for the next time, and building that organization, building that campaign, as I said, nursing those grudges. And as we talked today about Jackson and the bank and then Jackson versus Henry Clay in 1832 for the presidency. That idea of Jackson being someone who really nursed Grudges deeply and permanently will come back to join us as we talk a little bit more.

6:26 Very good. As we look at the veto message right here, he’s saying he’s going to veto it, it ought not to become a law. And down at the bottom, he mentions a few reasons and we’ll get back to his reasoning later on the conversation. But he says the bank is unauthorized

6:48 by the Constitution, so it’s unconstitutional. It’s subversive of the rights of the states and dangerous to the liberty of the people. And can you just talk maybe a little bit about how that fits into this? Maybe call it Jacksonian ideology and maybe Jacksonian democracy?

7:08 Sure, Tony, you’re exactly right, because I think everything about the bank veto and the war with the bank is called the bank war really is emblematic of so much about Jackson and his persona and his followers and how both he saw himself, but also how his followers and supporters saw him. Jackson really ran as a man of the people, as a commoner.

7:28 He ran against elites, against privilege, against the establishment, against entrenched power. One of the first people to do that. Certainly not the last presidential candidate who’s ever cast himself with an outsider. But Jackson ran selfconsciously as being a supporter of the little man,

7:49 the common laborer, the common worker, the small farmer. And I think that was a huge part of Jackson’s appeal because as you noted, when he gives the reasons, which we’ll go into a little bit more in detail later, for vetoing the bank bill, he really cast the bank as the plaything of the rich and the elite and the wealthy and those who would look down their noses

8:13 at the common, ordinary American, the common laborer. So Jackson asked this because I think he thought about it very much in those kind of class terms, not just economic class, but also there was a divide between education levels, a divide between wealth levels, a divide between family ties and connections.

8:34 And the bank sort of encapsulated all those bad things that constituted elites, monopoly power and those kinds of things. And that was everything Jackson had ever been against. So to come back to your original point, if Jackson were ever looking for a perfect opponent, it would be the bank and the people who supported the bank because they sort of were everything Jackson had always

8:56 opposed and always running against himself. Right. And there’s a certain evergreen quality to this. Right. We’re having some similar debates today. But going to the source here, he says something very interesting about

9:16 the relation of the different branches of government and the power of the courts. Right. And he says it is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that is constitutionality is in. All features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. And he says something arranged.

9:37 He says, to this conclusion, I cannot assist. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquisitions of the people in the states can be considered as well as settled. And he says, if the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act,

9:57 it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. And he goes on to say, the opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges. And on that point, the president is independent of it.

10:20 The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. Now, the way I understand that is that he’s saying, like the Supreme Court, precedent is certainly very important.

10:44 The judicial authority is invested in the courts, and they can decide cases, including constitutional issues. But the other branches, of course, have to also interpret the Constitution, right? The Congress, when they are considering bills and when they enact laws,

11:07 and the President, when he or she, has to sign a bill into law. And so each branch of government, I should say, does have the responsibility of assessing the constitutionality of laws. And I think this is really important

11:27 because I think he has a point in the sense that if you look at the history of the bank, this is exactly what happened. So we go back to 1791, early on in the Republic, and Alexander Hamilton introduces his plan for a national bank.

11:49 Now, it sends Congress it’s debated there quite contentiously, I might add. There’s a fair amount of opposition to it. And yet both houses of Congress, through majority rule, pass that bill into law. Then it’s onto. The President, George Washington has some qualms about it because he noticed the contention.

12:13 He saw the opposition. He didn’t see that there was a bank in Article One, Section Eight. So he has some qualms. And I would say that Washington always wanted to really follow the Constitution. That was a charge he took very seriously as president. And so he solicit the opinions of different members of his Cabinet,

12:38 and those are some are for and some are against, including Hamilton and Jefferson. And Washington considers their opinions and then eventually agrees with Hamilton and signs the bill and for law. Eventually, by 1819, the Court, under Justice John Marshall

13:01 in McCulloch v. Maryland, will decide on the constitutionality of the bank. And so what I see, Todd, is that each of the branches along the way agreed on the constitutionality of the national bank. And by the way, this took place again in 1816, when the bank is up for recharter,

13:25 they wait a few years because there’s some opposition. Madison is opposed to it, and yet eventually Congress and the President again enacted a second bank into law. And so Jackson just to turn it on his head a little bit, jackson’s concerns seem to have been met in terms of those different branches of government assessing

13:48 the constitutionality of the National Bank for several decades. Can you speak to that and maybe tell us a little bit more about that recharter in 1816 and the events that would lead up to?

14:09 I think, first of all, that’s a really good summary of a lot of history and constitutional law and everything else compacted into a very articulate presentation. So that’s a great asset for all of us, I think. But you’re absolutely right about that idea of this evolving, shall we call it, a conversation over who gets to read the Constitution and not

14:33 just interpret it, but who gets to exercise certain powers. And I think a lot of what is happening in those first several decades of United States life is under the Constitution is again trying to put the Constitution into practice and discover a kind of real world way of practically making it work.

14:53 So all those kinds of phrases and concepts of separation, of powers, of executive privilege, all these kinds of things have to be fleshed out. And I think whether it’s the debate over the bank or other kinds of major cases that often wound up being adjudicated by the Supreme Court, I think what Jackson is fundamentally reasserting in 1832 is the right

15:15 of the Executive to weigh in on constitutional matters. He really wants to push against the notion that only the Supreme Court, that is the sole arbiter of what is or is not constitutional. Because I think you can argue, from a constitutional standpoint, Jackson and others would argue that’s way too narrow and limiting and that would

15:35 give way too much power to the Supreme Court alone. So it is really you’re right, Tony. It’s a ringing kind of reclaiming of authority in some way. It’s sort of a challenge for the Court and a tweak to the Court in some ways, but it does. And I want to give you a chance to talk some more in just a second. And I want to come back, though, to this question about James Madison

15:57 and the Second Bank of the United States, because that’s a change that I think is really important that we ought to say more about even before we get into the heart and soul of the bank veto and the politics of the 1830s that led to it. Right well please jump right in on Madison because I think that he has some interesting changes

16:18 and evolutions in his own thinking about the constitutionality of the bank. He does. And the fascinating thing about Madison, as you know, is that he sometimes called the last of the fathers, because he lives until 1836. And so he not only has been there at the founding, present, at the creation, if you will, but he also has lived through so much time under the Constitution.

16:41 And of course, Madison throughout his life was kind of always people would write to him and say, well, what did the Founders mean by this? Or did the Constitution convention envision X or Y happening? So he sort of, as long as he’s alive, the living expert source you go to to find out about the Constitution, which was not always something he was comfortable with.

17:02 But when he did make his think about the Constitution and constitutionality, he was not rigid. And the best example of his flexible thinking, I think, came with the National Bank, which, as Tony had articulated earlier, Madison really was opposed, and he thought it was unconstitutional, that it was an abuse of a necessary and proper clause.

17:24 Back in 1791, when Hamilton proposed it, he fought against it vigorously in Congress, and that sort of began to touch off the great party battles that would very quickly emerge in the 1790s. But the bank was established over Madison’s objections and it continued to work until 1811 and then was allowed the charter was allowed to lapse.

17:45 But then with the War of 1812, the absence of a central bank to loan the government money or to store tax revenues or character and easier these kinds of things prove to be deeply problematic for the country and for the economy. They were one of the many ways, I think, in which the democratic republicans party of Jefferson and Madison rethought some

18:05 of their earlier objections, and they decided that some of what the federalists had done in the 1790s actually made a lot of sense. It was actually necessary in terms of governing the country. Now, of course, it would be much better, they thought, under their control than under Federalist hands. But I think one of the best examples of that is Madison’s change of heart

18:25 on the bank, because in 1816, partly in response to the crises of the 118 twelve, a bank recharter bill worked its way through congress, came to Madison’s desk, and Madison decided to sign it. And again, that would be the last thing you would ever expect from the Madison of 1791. But he was someone who learned through time, learned from experience,

18:46 reconsidered his opinions, was never sort of locked in on, I thought this when I was born, so I’m going to think of the rest of my life. He was really flexible on that. And what he argued in 1816 in signing the bank recharge bill was that the constitutionality of the bank has now been accepted by the American people, that they have now tried this.

19:08 They’ve lived under it, they liked it, they considered it constitutional. It didn’t meet challenges, it didn’t do the terrible things that some people like Madison, had expected. And so in this manner, then, for this reason, madison argued that he’s going to sign the bill because, as he put it, quoting from himself back in Federalist 37, he said, the meaning has now been liquidated.

19:30 In other words, it’s now been understood. It’s been ascertained we’ve tried it, because Madison in Federalist 37. And Tony, I’m sure you know this essay, it’s not as famous as ten or 51, but it’s in many ways, I think, crucial to understanding madison’s political thought. In 37. Madison argued. We’re going to draft laws and draft the constitution with the greatest care we can.

19:51 But we will never really know how this will play out. Or how this will work. Or what these various parts mean or don’t mean until we actually put it in practice and try it until we start. If you will. Using the constitution as a governing document. Not just a piece of paper in a glass case someplace. But when we actually start using it to govern.

20:12 And I think in saying that, he argued that basically until we begin to try out these questions and debate, is this constitutional? Can the president do x or y? Can congress do this? Who gets to remove cabinet members? These kinds of questions all would only be determined through time, as the meaning of the constitution was liquidated or sort of unfolded or discovered over time.

20:35 And so Madison argued in 1816 that the bank has now sort of been, the meaning of it has been liquidated. Its constitutionality has been established. And so now he says we’re good. I objected at first, but now we’re good on this. So he signed that second bank charter, and of course, that charter in 1816 that was up for renewal, would be up for renewal in 1836.

20:57 But advocates of the bank and some of their political friends in Congress decided to push for an early renewal of the charter. And of course, that’s what triggered all the controversy that ultimately would lead to Jackson’s bank veto. But I think Madison’s move is really significant there because it’s that that makes the second bank possible. And then it’s that second bank

21:17 in Philadelphia, the Nicholas Biddle eventually came to run, that would sort of raise all the red flags for Jackson and sort of be the repository of so much of his anger and resentment that, again, as he said, he was expressing on behalf of, he claimed, the American people. Right. And Todd, you really brought out something

21:38 I think is really important and I love to just chat about for a minute. It’s this idea of moderation, it’s this idea of prudence. These are civic virtues we talk a lot about at BRI and our materials. I know you’re writing about, actually that very idea in your book on the ratification of the Constitution.

22:03 I’ve seen it elsewhere, in Madison particularly, he had opposed the Bill of Rights, but then he came around for a variety of reasons to be its main advocate in First Congress. And you can think of other great moments in American history, lincoln and his moderation and the second Inaugural Address and other key moments in American history.

22:25 And I guess it just gives us pause to reflect on our own contentious times and the partisanship going on, and just to think that we can, as Americans compromise, we can rethink our views, we can see the good arguments of the other side, we can take a minute from our own partisan

22:50 lens here and see what’s for the good of the country. So do you think that’s what’s going on with Madison in 1816? I do think so. And I think in some ways it’s certainly safe for him to do that because the Federalist Party, for all intents and purposes, is sort of done. They’re essentially gone. They ran their last presidential candidate, as you know, in 1816.

23:13 So it’s safe to do that because there’s really not much of an opposition. But I do think Madison was someone who did and sort of always practiced that art of compromise, which he had. He claimed that was the great principle that came out of the Constitution, or I guess the great political art that came out of the Constitutional Convention. And so in Federalist 37,

23:34 he basically says that’s the model people should follow during ratification. Nobody gets everything they want, nobody gets every aspect of it, and just the way they want. There’s give and take. You’d have multiple interests, you’ve got different points of view. You’ve got all kinds of different priorities to juggle. And so it’s critical to find a way to compromise, to find some grounds where you can bring people together.

23:57 Well, let’s get to that recharter of the bank, right? Because obviously there’s some politics playing here going on. And the bank, as you mentioned, was supposed to be recharged in 1836. Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, some of their allies want to push

24:20 Nicholas Biddle to try to get Congress to renew it early, renew the charter in 1832, because I think it’s important to note for students and the bank had a series of 20 or charters. It wasn’t intended by Congress to last forever. And so they tried to recharge in 1832.

24:41 They think that Jackson won’t be able to pose it politically during his reelection campaign. And I think this strategy might have backfired. What do you think? Yeah, I think that’s a great point, Tony. And this so often happens in politics where you think, okay, here’s the winning move for our side.

25:03 Let’s bring this up now. Let’s delay this. And in fact, that’s exactly the wrong move because it does benefit the other side. One of the interesting things that a lot of historians have discovered about Jackson and the bank war is he did not come into office looking to destroy the bank. That was not one of his goals. He didn’t run on that as part of the platform.

25:24 He was deeply resentful of banks because of the panic of 1819, because they tended to call in loans and cut off credit to many people who are overextended. Jackson found himself with hundreds of thousands of Americans in that same situation. So he was resentful of banks in that personal way, but as a policy matter, he didn’t necessarily want to destroy the bank.

25:47 And there’s a lot of thinking that suggests that Jackson actually probably would have been open to a bank recharge in his second term, that he did not want it to be an issue in 1832. And the Wigs, of course, decided to force that as an issue. And the Wig Party is kind of we call it the Wig Party.

26:09 But of course Tony knows this well. They didn’t get technically formed as a party in some ways until after 1832, in part because there’s battle over the bank recharge. But the bank was kind of an issue that wasn’t Jackson’s calling card. And yet it’s now one of the things we most identify with him. And yet it’s mostly because the bank director.

26:32 Nicholas Biddle and friends in Congress like Henry Clay decided to push for an early recharge. Trying to force Jackson to either support it or veto it. Which they thought would cost him both in the crucial swing state of Pennsylvania. Which for so long 1800. 1824. 1832. Down to the present day

26:52 has become sort of a key swing state in presidential elections. So that was part of what was going on. And I think that the whole idea of rechartering the bank early was supposed to help the wigs and help the anti Jackson forces and the bank. But Jackson sort of saw this as an issue because, again, the bank almost perfectly

27:15 encapsulated all the things Jackson always liked to run against and all the things he saw himself opposing on behalf of the American people. And Tony knows well from having written so many political biographies and political studies, that if you were looking for a kind of character from central casting to play as sort of an elite,

27:36 snobbish, rich boy banker, it would be Nicholas Biddle, because he sort of, in every way acted the part, looked the part. He sort of made the perfect villain for Jackson in this battle, as Jackson sort of made it a contest of the people against the bank. Right. And this is exactly what he does. That’s a great segway into just a small excerpt from this vitamin message.

28:02 And I think this dials down into the heart of his argument. And then I want to ask you about his reasoning for each other in the bank. It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful, that class conflict you were talking about earlier, too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes.

28:23 Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government, he admits. But equality of talents, of education or wealth cannot be produced by human institutions if the full enjoyments of the gifts of heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy and virtue. Every man is equally entitled to protection by law.

28:44 But he says and this is really where he’s sort of attacking the bank when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages. Artificial distinctions to grant titles. Gratuities. Exclusive privileges to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful. The humble members of society. The farmers.

29:06 Mechanics. Laborers. Have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves. Have a right to complain of the injustice of their government. So, in a nutshell, why does he veto the national bank? Yeah. It’s a great question. And I think the paragraph you have up

29:27 there on the screen for us now is really cuts right to the heart of it. Because I think if you had to. He makes about four or five different arguments in this bank veto message. Which. By the way. Is sort of the product of many hands. But is mainly the work of Amos Kendall. Jacksonian supporter and adviser. Newspaper man.

29:48 Former newspaper man from New Hampshire. And sort of the person that Jackson can really talk to. They feel the same way, they have the same resentments, they have the same likes and dislikes in some ways. And Kendall was one of Jackson’s key writers for putting out these messages. But because of their closeness and similarity of views. These may be Kendall’s words.

30:09 But I think historians would argue. Myself included. That these are absolutely Jackson’s thoughts because he could really. In the same way that. Say Ted Sorensen did with John Kennedy. Peggy Newton did with Reagan. They may be their words. But they really can capture the thinking of the principles that they’re writing for very effectively as Kendall does here. And I think, Tony,

30:30 you put your finger on the key point here, really, which is for Jackson. All the problems of the bank kind of boiled down to this one great big thing. It puts way too much power in too few hands. And that’s economic power. It’s the power to grant favors and privileges, power to grant loans. It’s political power because the bank can exercise power in Congress by manipulating

30:54 or making grants or donations or contributions or things like that. It just puts way too much power in too few hands. And that’s why he feels, as president who constitutionally, he says, represents the people he needs to step in to oppose the bank. So he makes a constitutional argument, as you had walked us through earlier, against the bank.

31:15 But I think in many ways this is clearly a class argument against the bank. But again, note too that he doesn’t argue that we all need to be equal, that the purpose is for egalitarianism or redistribution. But he does argue against privilege. And he argues that it’s grossly unfair, as he notes, just reading from the language here, that these distinctions always exist,

31:38 but they should not be produced by human institutions. And then he goes on to say, make the rich richer and the potent more powerful. What happens, he says, to the humble members of society who don’t have access to this bank and to all of these things, they’re always going to be shut out. And so this is the reason he needs to step in. So it is a crusade might not be too strong a word.

32:01 It is certainly at least a campaign against the bank and its elite privileges because he thinks that skews the system against the humble members of society and it gives to those who already have so much even greater power. And power should be widely distributed and widely shared. But the major problem with this bank is that it just shrinks that power down

32:23 to the hands of only a few to the expense of literally millions of other Americans. So that is clearly a class based argument. But again, it’s also a very kind of populist political argument along with that that Jackson is trying to make here. And it’s a perfect kind of election year issue because he can tie the Wig Party and Henry Clay to Biddle and the bank.

32:48 He can tie that back to political corruption in general, which he believes cost him the presidency in 1824 and which he thought Clay was part of. It just ties together so many different things in a perfect kind of bow and I think the last point I would make is it also kind of jumpstarts to Jacksonian presidency in a way because his presidency up until that time had been in some ways kind of ineffectual a number of starts.

33:12 A number of initiatives. But much of the attention had been divided by the Peggy Eaton affair. Which of course split his cabinet and broke him ties with the vice president and drove Calhoun out and eventually brought in Van Buren for 1832. So in some ways the Jackson presidency is probably not sputtering. That’s probably too strong a term,

33:32 but I think it’s kind of looking for a rudder and direction. And at the perfect time in an election year, the Wigs and the banks were to come along and give Jackson this issue and in effect he is able to take it and sort of beat them over the head with it to win a decisive reelection. And then Jackson’s second term then is really where he makes so many of his great political stands.

33:53 He stands against the bank and vetoes that, he stands against the South Carolina nullifiers and then of course, he launches something that has been in process but he sort of begins the sets in motion the process that will lead to Indian removal. So all of those kinds of things that sort of we associate with the Jackson presidency I think really come mainly in the second term.

34:15 And that may not have ever been possible had it not been for the bank recharge issue, which gave him the right to the chance to veto this and then run on that as the campaign issue. So it’s a perfect combination of timing and events and it really does sort of, as I said, jump start or kickstart a presidency that was really looking for something to give it a spark.

34:37 As you were speaking, I was just thinking that it’s infused with Jeffersonian ideas, with Republican ideology, with a fear of aristocracy and centralized power and monarchy and the fear of corruption of the republic and so forth.

35:02 You brought out some really great points about Republican ideology, about Jacksonian, his vision and his presidency. And Todd Estes, I want to thank you very much for joining us. Thank you for your contribution to Life, Liberty, an the Pursuit of Happiness and we look forward to your forthcoming book..

35:26 Tony, thank you so much. It’s been an honor and a pleasure to work for BRI so many years for programs and on the textbook project. And I’ve really enjoyed this morning. So thank you for the invitation to take part in this with you. I’ve enjoyed it. Thank you. And all of our viewers, teachers and students can see a lot more primary sources via signing up for our textbook

35:47 at BillofRightsInstitue.org Thank you for joining us.