Lincoln, Frémont, and the Battle Over Emancipation with John Bicknell | BRI Scholar Talks

0:02 [Music] For this episode of Scholar Talks, we will discuss the different constitutional views of emancipation held by John Fremont and Abraham Lincoln. John Bnell, our guest, worked as a reporter, columnist, and editor for 30 years. He is the author of three books including America 1844, religious

0:24 fervor, westward expansion, and the presidential election that transformed the nation. Also Lincoln’s Pathfinder, John C. Fremont, and the violent election of 1856 and most recently today’s topic, the pathfinder and the president, John C. Fremont, Abraham Lincoln, and the

0:45 battle for emancipation. I am Tony Williams, senior fellow at the Bill of Rights Institute, and I want to welcome you to another episode of Scholar Talks in the America 250 series. John, I want to thank you very much for joining us. Thanks for having me on. Great. Well, congratulations on the new book. Uh I really I really love it. Uh just so well written and just a just a

1:07 dramatic tension between these two large figures. Uh one a former presidential candidate and one the current president. uh and just that that really important topic of that struggle over emancipation and and anti-slavery and and what’s to do with this complicated issue. So uh very well done. Thank you. So jumping

1:27 right in, John, uh can you provide us with a brief sketch of who John Fremont and Abraham Lincoln were before the Civil War? Uh and also maybe their their contending views of slavery. Sure. Well, Fremont um leading up to the Civil War was one of the most famous men in the world. Uh he had gained this fame uh

1:48 through his western exploration. Uh he was known as the Pathfinder of the West. He wasn’t really a pathfinder, but he was a pularizer of paths that were already there. And uh his reports of those travels uh government documents uh became bestsellers. people moving west

2:09 California and Oregon used them as as guide books essentially. Lincoln of course uh was an Illinois lawyer uh state legislator uh I think people are pretty familiar with who Abraham Lincoln is but the the difference between them is that Fremont was extremely famous and wellknown and Lincoln was not.

2:30 Yeah. A little ironic, right? Uh and Fremont runs for president, right? Uh, and Lincoln is, you know, in the Lincoln Douglas debate still a local politician, although gaining some some national um, uh, recognition, right? And and really the difference between them on slavery um, grew wider during the war through

2:53 the 1850s. Fremont was not particularly uh, active on this issue. He would he had been a senator from California for a few months. Um he was elected in 1850 as one of the first senators from California but drew the short straw so only served uh the brief term and he voted

3:13 uh to end the slave trade in the District of Columbia for example but not not for abolition in the district. Uh Lincoln was much more consistently anti-slavery much more vocal especially after the Kansas Nebraska Act in 1854. uh he was known as a leader in the

3:34 anti-slavery movement. Uh Fremont was not particularly even as the Republican presidential candidate in 1856. He supported the Republican uh platform which called for no extension of slavery. But neither man was an abolitionist. Neither man called for interfering with slavery uh where it already existed. Okay. Great. Yeah. Um,

3:57 and so my next question is, how did Fremont and Lincoln respond to that virtual civil war that’s going to uh occur in Missouri uh at the start of the Civil War? Interestingly, close to the same with a couple of key exceptions. Missouri was the one place where Lincoln from the

4:19 start um sort of supported a hard war, harder war anyway. most of the rest of the country and south, even in some of the border states, Lincoln was much more consiliatory uh than he was in Missouri. And he gave Fremont more room than he gave others to

4:40 fight a harder war um to to go after gerillas and that sort of thing. Now the exception of course was Fremont’s emancipation proclamation which came at the end of August in 1861 which was immediately reversed by Lincoln um cheerfully as Lincoln said

5:01 which kind of annoyed the abolitionists. Right. And and and I would love to dig around in that because it’s it’s it’s a big part of your book. Uh and so can you explain Fremont’s proclamation uh of of emancipation and martial law uh Lincoln’s re revocation of it and and the larger popular response to it, the larger public response?

5:23 Sure. Fremont very quickly came to the conclusion, he’d been there a little more than a month that the situation in Missouri demanded radical action. Uh that that there was so much contention. it was going to be so difficult uh to pacify the state that he needed to take a a big big step. And he did this

5:46 without consulting anyone. He didn’t consult Lincoln. He didn’t consult the governor who was a unionist but pro-slavery. Uh he didn’t even consult his wife about this. And he consulted her about almost everything. uh and he issued the Emancipation Proclamation as you say uh along with a declaration of statewide martial law uh that would have allowed him to uh execute essentially

6:09 anyone he thought deserved to be executed. So Lincoln not only overruled the emancipation order, he overruled the the execution order. Um, what separated them was Fremont’s insistence that emancipation was necessary, was a military necessity. We were going to win

6:30 the war. We had to cut the legs out from under the Confederacy and that meant freeing the slaves because they were doing work that was supporting the Confederacy. Now, early in August, the first confiscation act was passed. Lincoln signed it into law, but it allowed for the freeing of slaves only who were working directly in very

6:52 specific jobs for the Confederate army. Uh Fremont went far beyond that. Uh but he did not ground his proclamation in the first confiscation act. He cited the laws of war, military necessity. Lincoln at this point was not ready to take that step. He uh he believed that that power rested

7:15 with him. Now, it’s a power that the president can delegate. He delegates to soldiers the power to kill people. So, he could delegate the power to to free slaves, but he wanted to reserve that power. He didn’t believe that step was necessary. He saw preserving the Union and freeing the slaves as separate acts. Fremont, many others saw them as

7:37 inextricable, that it would not be possible to preserve the Union without freeing the slaves. Right. Gotcha. Uh and and the larger response, I guess, I guess it varies, right? Um including some important, you know, congressmen and allies as well as the broader media and so forth. Sure. It it was popular among strongly anti-slavery people in

7:59 the north, obviously. Um and really It was at that moment that Fremont became what I call the military in he was the he was the military symbol of emancipation and he remained that really throughout the war. Uh even after the emancipation proclamation people still

8:20 looked at Fremont as that person. um very popular, but not very popular, certainly not with Democrats in the North who who opposed it. And some Republicans who were wary, who believed, as Lincoln did, uh that emancipation in Missouri would put at risk uh not just

8:42 Missouri, but Kentucky, Maryland, the the slave states that had remained in the Union. Lincoln believed this fervently and really that underpinned his entire objection to the proclamation. I’m there’s a great historical debate about this. Uh I tend to come down on the side of that Lincoln

9:03 overwori that but he certainly had a legitimate worry and and acted on it. Right. Great. Can can you explain that just a little bit more for our audience just in the sense that this sort of credential approach from from Lincoln uh or you also call it I think a political approach you he’s he’s very worried about losing these border states right

9:23 and so can can you explain why why he’s so worried about the effect of proclamation and it really was a political decision not a constitution this was not based on a constitutional concern about about who had emancipation power if anybody Lincoln really framed this as a political decision, political military decision about mostly Kentucky and he

9:46 got a lot of blowback uh from friends Joshua Speed, Joseph Holt, um even Robert Anderson, the hero of Sumpter who was a Kuckian uh wrote to Lincoln saying we just we can’t have this um if if you free slaves in the border states or allow Fremont to do it.

10:07 um the people of Kentucky will rise up and join the Confederacy. So Lincoln didn’t want to risk that. He believed that Kentucky was the lynch pin to the entire war effort, absolutely essential. Um as uh northern armies moved into the south and he had a point about that. Um I think events showed however that that

10:29 concern was overblown. Lincoln always overestimated union sentiment in the deep south and underestimated union sentiment in in the border states um and continued to for much much of the war. Um would Kentucky have left? I honestly don’t think they would have. Um they’d

10:49 have made a lot of noise, but the truth is Lincoln started talking about emancipation just a few months after he overruled Fremont. That was he overruled Fremont in early September of 1861 and by December of 1861 he was lobbying members of Congress about a proposal he was going to make for gradual

11:10 compensated emancipation. So you’re talking about September, October, November, December, three months. So did the world change in those three months? There were no major battles. Nothing nothing big changed in the war. But by December, Lincoln was already talking to members of Congress about emancipation. And Kentucky did not leave

11:31 the Union. And when he made the proposal in March, they didn’t leave the Union. And when they abolished slavery in Washington DC in April of 1862, Kentucky didn’t leave the Union. And they didn’t leave the Union when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. I don’t think they would have left in September of 1861 either. Right. So, so if he loses

11:51 the border states, he’s losing, you know, control of the Mississippi and and you know, if Maryland joined, then uh DC would be surrounded. So, so Lincoln thought pretty strategically about these things, although in an overblown way, as you might argue, I I think so. And while I while I say all that, I you know, in the moment, you never know

12:12 what’s going to happen. So, Lincoln acted prudently as he saw the situation and it worked out just fine for him. So everything was, you know, okay. I just think there we we ought to consider that other things might also have a work, right? No, it makes sense. And it leads me to my next question. I mean, you argue in the book that Lincoln uh quote unquote sort of came around uh to

12:34 Fremont’s point of view on emancipation uh and leading of course as you alluded to his his own emancipation proclamation uh in the in the not too far distance. Uh so uh can you explain what you mean a little bit by that? Sure. And also bear in mind Kentucky and Missouri especially had to be fought over anyway. They

12:55 stayed in the Union but they were the scene especially Missouri scene of constant battles all through the war. Mhm. Um in March of 1862, Lincoln made his proposal um to to have compens to have the federal essentially have the federal government subsidize emancipation for

13:16 anybody any state that would voluntarily do it. Uh he called in Frank Blair who was a great foil for Fremont in Missouri um who was the only Republican member of Congress from the border states. But he talked to the border state congressman. they weren’t they would have none of it. Um he moved on from that. It it came up

13:38 for a vote in the in and gosh nobody would go for it. Um in July uh Mlen sends this famous letter to Lincoln about no here here’s how you should run the war and it doesn’t have anything to do with emancipation. And I think it was at that point others believe this Montgomery Blair believed it that this was really the turning point for Lincoln. Uh it was

14:00 only a week later that he had the conversation with a couple members of his cabinet uh saying, "I think we’re going to have to I think we’re going to have to do this." Um and then about 10 days after that, they had the cabinet meeting where he announced that he was going uh to announce an emancipation proclamation. Um Sewer suggested he wait

14:22 until they had a victory in the field or something like a victory which Lincoln agreed to. And then in September he issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation after after antidum and then it took effect on January 1st 1863. The interesting part as far as Fremont is concerned is that Lincoln used absolutely Fremont’s reasoning of

14:45 military necessity. He didn’t cite the first or second confiscation acts a law that had been passed in July. Um he cited the president’s authority to act uh for military necessity. Uh so he really just followed uh Fremont’s blueprint with in less than a year after he had overruled Fremont.

15:07 Now it doesn’t mean even that Lincoln never believed that that power existed. He didn’t want to use it at that point. He was he was a cautious man. He was a lawyerly man. He believed strongly in the constitution and the rule of law. And he wanted to reunite the country as quickly and as peaceibly

15:32 as possible as you can do in a war. Um and he believed that the path to do that was not to just create this incredible cultural disruption uh that emancipation would bring. And by the summer of 1862, it’d reach the same conclusion that Fremont had already reached the the year before, which was it’s not going to be possible

15:54 to do that, right? Gotcha. So, uh, in light of all this, uh, how did their paths cross, uh, for the duration of the war then? Yeah. Um, well, Fremont, he relieved Lincoln Wick relieved Fremont of command in Missouri in in late October of 1861. Uh Freeman had a lot of problems and it was not just

16:15 emancipation was in fact it wasn’t I think emancipation much at all. Um he was not a very competent military leader. Um he was a terrible administrator. A lot of graft going on. He wasn’t enriching himself. He was already rich but his his friends and associates were enriching themselves. Um and he had this political problem with

16:37 Frank Blair who was a congressman from St. Louis. uh son of Francis Preston Blair, very powerful man in Washington, friend of Lincoln. Uh Frank was also a friend and ally of Lincoln and really Lincoln’s viceroy in Missouri. Um and when Frank Blair lost confidence in Fremont as a military leader, um he told

16:58 people about it, his brother, president, and when Fremont found out that he had told them, he arrested him. Now you’re arresting the son of this very powerful man, this friend of Lincoln. Um, it doesn’t go over very well. That was really to me the end of Fremont. And it was only a month later or so that I was relieved. Uh, FA’s a very popular man

17:21 with um abolitionists with anti-slavery people. Uh, and they pester Lincoln essentially into giving him another job. uh commander of the mountain department in western Virginia in 1862. Um another military folly. Fremont again doesn’t do very well in the field.

17:42 Um fails against Stonewall Jackson. No shame in that really, but he still did. Um and then when Lincoln uh put John Pope in charge of the army of Virginia and tried to consolidate uh the the smaller armies under Pope Fremont resigned. He left he left his command

18:04 saying I can’t serve under Pope. Pope had been an insubordinate uh junior officer in or subordinate officer in Missouri. Um Fremont didn’t like him very much. Jesse hated him. Um, and Pope was junior to Fremont in the service. So, Fremont said, "I can’t surrender, Pope." And left. He didn’t

18:26 leave the army, but he resigned to command. So, he goes home. Uh, there’s talk all through the rest of 1862 and 1863 about giving Fremont another command. U, perhaps even putting him in charge of all uh, black troops. Um, yeah, I know it’s kind of amazing really, but it was a political situation

18:46 and Lincoln consistently returned to these political generals because he believed he needed them uh to maintain political support in Congress. Um, there was talk of making Fremont military governor of North Carolina. Uh, a job for which he would have been incredibly ills suited. Um, none of that came to pass. And so in

19:09 in late 1863, the beginning of 1864, it becomes clear that Fremont’s going to run for president. Uh he’s either going to challenge Lincoln for the Republican nomination or failing that he’s going to run as a third party candidate. He he’s very bitter about the way he sees he sees he’s been treated. Uh not as bitter as his wife, but he’s pretty unhappy

19:29 about it. Uh and he has real policy differences with Lincoln. things like it has moved too slowly uh even on after the emancipation proclamation. Uh but also uh perhaps more importantly in terms of the Republican nomination Fremont and some of his supporters including uh the famous

19:49 abolitionist Wendell Phillips believe Lincoln is not going to be hard enough on the south once victory is achieved. So Fremont becomes the nominee of something called the radical democracy, the radical democratic party. Uh it’s kind of a rag tag group of abolitionists and uh German Americans, very popular German

20:10 Americans in in the Midwest and Missouri. Um but it the the campaign amounts to almost nothing. Um Lincoln is in trouble politically. It looks like he’s going to lose, but it looks like he’s going to lose MQL, not to Fremont. The war is going badly. Um and then all of a sudden the war turns around. Um uh

20:32 they capture Mobile. Um Sheridan has success in the valley and of course Sherman captures Atlanta which turns the whole notion of the war around uh toward a northern victory and Lincoln becomes popular again and in the middle of September uh Fremont withdraws from the

20:53 race. He withdraws extremely ungracefully. Uh he goes out saying terrible things about Lincoln. Uh people, some people think there was a deal made. If there was a deal made, Fremont didn’t live up to it. Um but he did leave the race and Montgomery Blair, who was Frank Blair’s brother and was postmaster general and probably the

21:14 least popular of the Lincoln cabinet officials among the abolitionist wing of the party, uh resigned. So Fremont came out looking kind of bad but got Blair out of the cabinet anyway. Right. So um final question coming back

21:34 to our original uh question. Uh what were the different constitutional political views of John Fremont and Abraham Lincoln regarding emancipation? I think the different view was that that Fremont Fremont got to military necessity a year sooner than

21:55 Lincoln. Um, they were both, you know, we sometimes Bill C refer to Lincoln as a reluctant emancipator. I think I do once in the book, but I’m not sure that’s really accurate. He wasn’t reluctant to be an emancipator. Um, he was prioritizing things as president and emancipation came second.

22:17 And for Fremont, he saw them he saw emancipation and union as inseparable. Others did. I mean, Charles Sumner, uh, George Julian, a radical congressman from from Indiana, uh, many other people shared that view. Um, it just took Lincoln more time to

22:37 get there. Um, and it may be just that because Fremont was exposed to the to the radical problem in Missouri up close is how he got there faster because he really hadn’t there was no indication that he believed that before. He had given a speech in May of 1861 while he

22:58 was still at Europe uh talking about welcoming the South back into the Union if they just laid down their arms. He didn’t mention slavery at all. So somewhere between May and August, Fremont evolved as people say about Lincoln. Well, somewhere between September and December to July,

23:19 uh Lincoln evolved into the same situation. There’s a great exchange of letters between Lincoln and his friend Senator Orville Browning from Illinois, excuse me, that really explicate these constitutional issues. Um, to me, Browning gets the better of the

23:40 argument. But of course, Lincoln won the argument because he was president. Um, but Browning did a a masterful job of explaining Fremont’s case much better than Fremont could himself. Right. Yeah, definitely a great part of the book. I enjoyed reading about that. Um, so, so John, I want to thank you very much for joining us and, uh,

24:01 congratulations on your brilliant new book and thanks for coming to discuss this this really important topic. Thanks a lot, Tony. I appreciate it. Great. And thank you all for joining us on this episode of Scholar Talks. Please check out the other interviews in our America 250 series on our channel. [Music]

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