Debating US and China Policy, Part 1| Charles Glaser, George Washington U | Lincoln-Douglas

hello everybody and welcome to the Bill of Rights institute’s debate resolution preparation web um we’re really excited to have you all here we are going to get started in just a second tonight we have with us Dr Glazer from George Washington University Elliot School Institute for security security and conflict studies waiting for everybody to hop in Dr Glazer you can go ahead and start your your video okay good awesome we’re good okay so I’ll give us a little introduction thank you all for showing up as I said my name is Jeffrey horn from the bill Rights Institute I’m the director of student programs and we’re really really excited to hold these res resolution preparation webinars tonight we’ll be looking at the national speech and debate Association policy resolution the United States resolved the United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China um as I said tonight’s expert is Dr Charles El Glazer uh he is a professor of political science and International Affairs and the director of The George Washington University Elliot School Institute for security and conflict studies his research focuses on international relations Theory and international security policy uh Dr wizer will give us approximately a half hour of his time to address you on the issue after which he will spend about 25 minutes having a Q&A session answering any questions you guys have regarding um this resolution and then without further Ado I’ll Dr Glazer hello and welcome I’ve never done one of these webinars before so hopefully it will go well and I look forward to your questions my research tends to focus or focuses on International Security questions not economics questions so I’m going to spend most of my time this evening addressing on the security side of things I will touch on economic issues and because we have limited time I going actually try to sketch a variety of issues um that are relevant to the question of diplomacy and particularly diplomacy in the economic realm and leave questions time for questions for you to um dig into some of the details more broadly so I want to frame the question by saying that or the issue of this resolution by saying there are two very basic questions um that you should consider addressing the first um which many

people may Overlook is the question of whether or not the United States should retain its commitments specifically as security commitments to East Asia this is what’s called the Grand strategy question um there’s not a lot of debate on it in the policy world there’s in actually in the government there’s a fair amount of discussion these days in the academy and the and think tanks on this question so I’m going to spend less time on it but I want to sketch it out for you the second question would be assuming we’re staying in East Asia which is a very good assumption for the um near and medium- term and probably for the long term what are the different ways in which the United States can engage and what are some of the arguments um for and against greater or lesser engagement so let me start then on this question of whether the United States should maintain its security commitments in East Asia um the United States as you know or I expect that all of you know since I’ve learned that Debaters are very conscientious that the United States has um longstanding um Alliance commitments in East Asia most prominently um with Japan and South Korea but also importantly um with the Philippines and we also have friendships that are not complete Security commitments with a number of other countries in the region the debate um I’m going to divide it into two schools partly just so you can get the basic shape of the argument first I’ll say what the what the arguments are for leaving um and this is what’s um the school or the set of arguments is um often captured under the term Neo isolationist Neo Neo isolationists argue that the United States can better achieve its security commitments um by leaving by ending its security um alliances in East Asia and in um in Europe in Western Europe in particular but Western and Central Europe um and simply protecting its Homeland narrowly um this is very it’s quite as I said it’s quite contrary to current US policy but this would entail in East isia would entail breaking our alliance commitments and bringing home the forces that we for deploy um in quite substantial numbers in South Korea and Japan so what was the argument B for breaking the security commitment I just mentioned three points um first the argument is that the United States can be highly secure and is highly secure with respect to China without these forward commitments because it’s far away and specifically the great distance between the United States and China um and in particular the fact that it’s water which makes makes it even harder for the United States to be attacked means United States is is very highly secure without these allies um second um the United States even is even more secure because it has a highly effective nuclear deterrent which China has no prospects for undermining and therefore the United States in a sense has these two very powerful deterrent um and denial capabilities that increase its security um third

um proponents of NE ation ISM argue that the United States can stay out of any war that happens in East Asia if there were a substantial war between China and Japan or between North Korea and South Korea that Drew in China um the United States could stay out of the war and therefore we don’t need to be forward deployed and forward committed to avoid getting involved in those large conflicts and on the foot side they argue by staying in the region um we may well get drawn into conflicts or be directly involved in conflicts that we will not able to avoid um so overall the argument is that we’re fine without these alliances now just to remind you why am I bringing this up if the question is should the United States engage more or less diplomatically um with China now obviously if we broke our commitments to East Asia um it would greatly reduce the number of possible um topics or issues on which we could engage and so this is really a foundational question it’s often taken for granted but if you wanted to argue that we should be less engaged um with China One very strong way to get it as might be or would be to look at our grand strategy commitment um Neo isolationists however do not argue um that the United States should end its economic involvement and in fact a large part of their argument is that we can maintain um the very high levels of economic engagement we have now maintain the open economic system without having the alliance commitment ments um in the region okay so what are the counter arguments so I’m going keep going quickly because I want to get to the to the other the second question but what are the counterarguments the first argument is um that the United States could easily get drawn into a war between the United States um between China and Japan or between China and South Korea um history suggests that this is a danger the United States got drawn into the first and second world wars when it was not committed and did not have Alliance commitments in Europe and the United States um joined um the war the Korean War um when it did not have a commitment on the Korean Peninsula so simply not having commitments at least historically has not been a good way or a good indicator of staying out of commitments um the second main commitment is the United States has among its major security um interest is that it’s interested in nonproliferation and our alliance commitments in general and specifically in East Asia are understood as supporting our non-proliferation policy specifically um China China not China sorry Japan and South Korea would very likely get nuclear weapons it’s very easy for them technically to do so would likely get nuclear weapons if the United States broke its Alliance commitments to these countries and it obviously would then break its nuclear um commitment to protect them against nuclear attack or losing a conventional War so we have a kind of broader SEC security interest in

ceration being there the third argument is that um economic um the our economic well-being as well as the well-being of our allies depends upon our security commitments and specifically that if the United States were to pull out of the region you’d start to see greater military competition which I think is very very likely um this military competition would eventually um tend to undermine the open economic order and would hurt the United States economically as as free trade um decay um I’m not going to try to um adjudicate the debate I would be glad to go into it in Greater detail both of the schools I’ve identified have present presented much more nuanced positions there are some divides even Within These schools that I’m not touching on um and there actually a couple other schools but the point here um is that if we stay in the region and maintain our current policy which I’m strong which I tend to be in favor of although I respect the other arguments um then we have to ask the second question which is how should we be engaged okay um so then I’m going to move to that second question which is maybe more in the sphere of the resolution although I don’t know how you’re going to take it on as a debate question let me touch briefly on economic engagement because I’m not going to talk about it at length um but should should raise it first of all it’s important to um keep in mind that the United States is very very extensively engaged with China already economically um as you know the two countries are highly um engage highly interdependent there’s large trade um in both directions um the us we have the US has a trade deficit with China but there’s large amounts of trade in both directions um in addition China um is a member of the World Trade Organization as is the United States so that on a variety of issues that are covered by the WTO which actually covers a very wide range of pre-trade issues um the United States and China are already already have agreement and are engaged through um The Cooperative mechanisms and consultation consultative mechanisms of the WTO um in the economic realm what are the ways there could be further engagement what are the current topics okay many of you if you haven’t heard about it in the US China context have heard about it in the context of the ongoing on presidential debate there’s a debate over TPP which is a transpacific partnership um China is not a member of this Accord which still is not is not a not radic ratified treaty as you know at this point both candidates um are skeptical of the treaty although Hillary Clinton was a supporter or of the agreement um China is not a party to the was not a party of the negotiations or the agreement um some people believe this was a good idea it’s a way for the United States to gain an economic advantage in the region it’s a way to reduce um China’s economic influence in the region it’s a way to compete economically with China other people think the United States should have tried harder on to include China

earlier um thinking it would be a way to bring China into more yet more fully into the economic order um avoid having it feel excluded um and avoid this dimension of competition then there’s a third position which is it would be good to have China in but it’s so far from being able to meet the current um requirements of the agreement that it would have simply slowed down negotiations um so if you anyway in short if you’re in favor of increasing economic engagement one obvious um and current debate or and current issu is over TPP a second issue which you may not have heard of unless you’re um following economic issues is What’s called the aib which is the um Asian infrastructure Investment Bank this is a Chinese initiative um designed to like it sounds increase investment um in infrastructure and um basic um economic capabilities in Asia um interestingly the United States was opposed to this um Chinese initiative um arguing that in a variety of ways for World Bank to do a better job on these issues the United States discouraged its allies from joining um but nevertheless many US allies including um Great Britain um have joined as founding members of the iib which um started functioning I think at the end of 2015 um so there are issues about what the US policy will be about this I many China experts in the United States think it was a mistake for the United States to oppose um but any that’s on the economic front Okay so let me turn to the Diplomatic negotiations and here once again I’m going to lean toward security issues but security and foreign policy isues obviously overlap um so what are the type of ways that the United States could be more engaged with China um so what what would a list be um first um we’re engaged in the region somewhat diplomatically um although at a distance right now with China on a variety of territorial disputes that you’re probably familiar with in the East China and South China Seas um and I’ll start um with that issue so the United the United States has position on these disputes on whether it’s the spratley islands on the parisel islands in the South China Sea whether it’s the sakua dispute in the East China Sea is it it’s neutral about the outcome of the territorial dispute it however opposes changes in the status quo through the use of military force or coercion however the United States even though it’s taken this neutral position is actually quite involved in these disputes because the disputes are between China um and it’s and certain Regional allies or certain Regional neighbors who are allies of the United States so when East China see the US um alliance with Japan has it rather directly involved um in s Kaku de dispute um in the South China Sea us

Alliance the alliance with the Philippines and it’s not military Alliance but it’s growing um friendship and interest in Vietnam um have the United States on the opposite side or working with countries with whom China has um these disputes um so the question is what kind of diplomatic role can the United States play if it wanted to increase its role um this is hard because China it is hard if you wanted to increase um the US diplomatic role because China position is that the United States has no role in helping to the um the resolution of these issues China wants to negotiate on a bilateral basis with between itself and the disputant it does not want to take um these disputes into a multilateral forum like for example aan or for a group of countries um who has specifically overlapping disputes many of the disputes in the South China are not only between China and one other country but are between China and a number of Southeast Asian countries that themselves have overlapping disagreements um in the South China Sea China doesn’t want to um pursue those disputes in a multilateral forum um so the United States has little means therefore um to increase its engagement with China One thing about diplomacy um is diplomacy takes a partner if the United States is going to increase its diplomatic engagement with China China has to be willing and vice versa if China wants to increase its engagement with us we have to be willing on these on these island disputes um which right now are the key flas point I don’t think they’re the most important um point of dispute but they are the key flas point the key month to month or even day-to-day points of contention um China does not see a diplomatic role for the United States we’ve stated that we’re willing to help um but we don’t’s not um between China and the partners are actually in a in a group a multilateral group that’s not an option the United States may end up playing a military role which it does not want to play um but it is now committed particularly to Japan is explained that zakus which is a Japanese name for the islands specifically fall under the US Japan um security treaty so if those islands were attacked and if Japan couldn’t protect them on its own and China called on the United States to help defend that um the its interest in the S hakus um the United States would have a very hard decision to make but it is now part of its treaty commitment okay a second issue which I’ve actually written on and is um still more contentious and would identify a much larger role um for the United States is Taiwan and some of you I know just from emails that I got even before I offered to um participate in this webinar which which I’m very pleased to do had contacted me about the Taiwan issue so I’ve argued that the United

States should pursue a very ambitious um set of negotiations with China over Taiwan um and over the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes um and specifically um should pursue a grand bargain um before I go into the details I want to make clear that um the grand bargain does not have wide support in the United States and so even if China wanted to through this um negotiation it’s would say far from Clear um more accurate to say maybe unlikely um that the United States would pursue it um right now um China is pursuing a variety of policies that also that make it unlikely um that China would want to pursue this um deal Al I think it’s very much in its interest and actually much more in China’s interest than in the US interest let me just lay out the um the basic logic of the deal and why people might be in favor why I’m in favor and why others disagree um I’m going to take a lot I think I’ve got about six or seven minutes so I’m going to take further um and then I’d be glad to take questions on this but I want to save a few minutes at the end um to talk about other possible areas of diplomatic engagement so the basic idea of the grand bargain would be that if China would resolve its disputes in the East China and South China Seas um with the relevant um disputants um the United States would then break its commitment to defend Taiwan the United States has a longstanding although somewhat ambiguous and somewhat complicated commitment to Taiwan um it’s evolved over time because the US relationship with China and Taiwan has changed and when the US officially recognized China it significantly changed um its commitment to Taiwan um but nevertheless the United States Loosely speaking has the commitment to protect Taiwan um if China uses Force um against Taiwan um for reasons that are not provoked by Taiwan um specifically if you might say to yourself if you’re not following this issue how might Taiwan provoke an attack and the argument there or the concern there is if Taiwan declares independence um although it actually has day-to-day Independence but if it actually declared its own um Independence or even moov to close to declaring independence the China might use Force to prevent it from the US perspective that would be a provoke um a provocation um and would not the United States at least under certain understandings of its commitment would not be committed to come to taiwan’s defense one of the dangers in the relationship is there’s some substantial ambiguity or grayness about what would be provocation in any event um the argument with respect to the islands um is twofold one or why it’s important um first it would eliminate a variety of other flash points and therefore just like um eliminating the Taiwan danger which I’ll talk about in a

minute El eliminating these dists would eliminate um those dangers but if a maybe more important issue and the thing I have focused on in my article is that um China’s willingness to make concessions on the disputes would show that its AIMS in a region are not unlimited and for reasons I’ll get to in a moment that’s very important so what are the benefits from the US perspective of cutting it or ending its commitment to Taiwan um first of all um it is the most important territorial disagreement um between the United States and China um Taiwan is a large economy 16th GMP GDP in the world 23 million people if you compare that with the spratley and the um pels um which are essentially uninhabited have very little value have almost no strategic value Taiwan is obvious is orders and Orders of more important at least in in material terms um it turns out it’s very important to China it it’s a long historical commitment um since the end of the Chinese Civil War to unifying with Taiwan um it St a lot of its current nationalist um the regime has sted much of its current nationalist credentials um on eventually achieving that goal um in addition the US commitment to Taiwan raises serious doubts um in China about the US trustworthiness it’s often seen as one of the key reasons that CH that China does not trust the United States is that China is on the quote from China’s perspective the United States is on the wrong side of this dispute um and finally an issue I think that is maybe underappreciated is much of the military competition between the United States and China is indirectly if not directly over Taiwan because if a large conflict happens um over Taiwan the United States is currently in a situation where we can cut off the flow of oil and other resources to China um there’s no easy way to solve this military um conflict in the what are call in the sea Lanes the sea lines of communications which they called the slocks um for variety of reasons eliminating the Taiwan problem will reduce the military concerns that are generated by us um Naval advantages in over the ceedings so to sum it up I mean there are three major reasons one is CH Taiwan is a flash point um two um it exacerbates China’s view of the United States seeing us as more negative and threatening than we are um and three it fuels or supports military competition between United States and China which is dangerous so what are the arguments against the key argument against this deal um is that it’s dangerous to encourage an expansionist power especially a rising power about your about the declining Powers um res other

words China is a rising power United States is a declining power if the if the United States makes concessions it may look weak making a concession to a very expansionist state or what I call a greedy state is dangerous because that state may want to will then ask for more so if you believe that China is quite fist that it wants to control all of the South China Sea that it wants to win the territorials in the East China and South China seas that it possibly wants to push the United States um out of J out of the region push Force the United States to break its Alliance commitments with Japan and South Korea then it’s a very bad idea to make concessions on Taiwan because we run the risk of encouraging China on the other hand if China has limited names or is just interested in security then our concessions can reassure China um making China more secure um making it more satisfied with the status quo um and could actually end the dispute for some of the reasons um that I already that I’ve mentioned um other reasons um against this we many many commentators and one I think maybe the most common criticism is if we make consessions to China it will undermine our allies confidence in our willingness to keep up the alliances so specifically major concessions to China will undermine Japan’s confidence and South Korea’s confidence in in the US alliances with those countries weaking those alliances undermines US security goals in the region if you believe that the United States needs to maintain those commitments um under the type of grand strategy we currently have um so somebody would argue we need to maintain our commitments to Taiwan not because it’s important on its own terms but because we want to protect the US Japan Alliance or the US South Korea Alliance and then finally some people argue that Taiwan is strategically important if you look at the map um it pushes it would enable if China militarized Taiwan um to push it Forward its forces for further to the east it would actually eliminate a choke point that the United States now maintains it makes it hard for China to get out the sea and so on and so forth so there a military reason um each of these issues then um becomes very important to look at more carefully um I’m going to stop there and talk um leave questions um for question and answer um I think it’s a very very important issue but like I say I’m a bit of an outlier in this so I don’t want to mislead you at all about the nature of the debate but I think analytically um the case is at least Clean and Clear very very briefly what are other areas where there might be more diplomatic engagement um first of all um with China over North Korea um United States and China were involved in the six-party talks um to try and stop and then that can reduce further proliferation by North Korea um those

talks have basically come to a standstill um largely because the United States does not want to continue um engaging with North Korea given it’s not willing to meet some very basic terms um that the United States wants so that’s a possibility but right now it’s not going very very very far the United States is actively engaged now in what are called military milit to military talks with China which means like just like it sounds between very high level talks between our military and the Chinese military these have been on going over the years but also interrupted um at various times when us China relations were strained the idea here is very important is to avoid the kind of dangers that can result um from undesirable misunderstandings when forces are in close contact when forces do certain things that might be misunderstood um So to avoid a lot of the risk that can come from operating in close quarters which increasingly the United States and China are and then finally there’s the room for the United States and China to engage specifically on the question of strategic nuclear forces um the Obama Administration has tried very hard to get this strategic nuclear dialogue going um it’s um made explicit its desire it has um requested um these talks with China um and for a VAR of reasons like I can go into China has not taken up the United States um on this um on this issue so this is a case where we could do more the United States wants to do more um it does not at this point have a willing partner with China um and so there’s not much progress there but I think it’s a very valuable place um to look further and really I’m out of time but I’m going to take one more minute and say there is one other area of Engagement in which the United States um and CH are engaged it’s not diplomatic engagement it’s at this point military competition um given the state of the relationship and China is improving military capability which is natural given the starting its starting point and that it’s a rising power um the United States and China are increasingly engaged in military competition some people think this is good some people think it’s dangerous um in a different world we might be looking at possibilities for arms control between the United States and China um right now those are not going very far are and they’re not um there not many many promising areas but there are some um areas in which that might be the POS possibilities for engagement down the road so let me stop there I think I’ve talked just about the right amount of time I’m going to take a quick look at the questions I’ve gotten I’ve only gotten there a few so let me look at these and then I’ll try to I’ll pick a couple and give you time to address more so I’ll be right back okay so there are a couple questions here um about trust um and so let me

mention why I what some of the issues are about China’s lack of trust in the United States and um there’s always a question I think I’m G first say what they are it’s it’s always quite complicated to sort out whether this trust is warranted um but let’s keep the following things in mind first one thing many you probably know is that there is um China over the last many decades has developed a narrative of um dis that it was disrespected by the Western Powers over over a century um partly this is a um a history of um does not primarily involve the United States but of colonial Powers um in China preceding um World War II um but also us um but so anyway there’s that whole long history which I don’t have time kind review but many of you probably know um there’s also um the Cold War history in which I wouldn’t say that China that most people don’t China doesn’t so much um identify this as disrespect by the United States but there is we need to remember that the post um the Cold War order and the last couple decades the postc Cold War order are largely built by the United States the United States is the only Power around the globe during the Cold War and even more since the end of the Cold War that deploys forces um around the globe um quite large forces in East Asia um and has major military advantages that China does not have so in addition to this um to the century um of humiliation um you have really the United States as if not the global hedgemon throughout the Cold War certainly the global hedgemon um in East Asia and even more so third there is the question of Taiwan which I think is a major sticking point um is a I shouldn’t say scking point it’s a major point of disagreement and it’s Central both to um China’s um historical narrative Central to its um nationalist narrative um and the United States is on the wrong side of this dispute from China’s um perspective we not only have the um the commitment to come to China’s defense that I mentioned but we also um sell arms to Taiwan terms that are ident arms that are identified as you know necessary for Taiwan to defend itself but keep in mind that from China’s perspective taiwan’s ability to defend itself is threatening because China wants to be able to use Force if necessary to prevent Taiwan um from declaring independence so what we see as defensive and Taiwan sees as defensive um is understandably not necessarily justifiably but understandably from China’s perspective um threatening and then finally keep in mind that closely related to our large power projection um capabilities deployed in East Asia the United States has alliances um in China’s what China will reasonably consider its backyard we have alliances with its near Neighbors on its periphery with Japan and South

Korea um and in somewhat different degree with the Philippines imagine if um China had alliances with say Canada and Mexico and had large bases um within um 100 or 200 kilometers of the US border um and that even if we didn’t have military disputes or I should say political disputes with China um whether the United States would feel comfortable simply with those military deployments but in a world where you do have disputes um it’s quite natural just by the nature of major power politics um for states to um not trust each other or I would say worry about about the other states motives and intentions and so instead of seeing on the United States as a benign unthreatening power that only wants to protect itself China sees the United States as a power that wants influence far beyond its borders um and sometimes in ways that are contrary quite significantly contrary um to China’s interests so I would say um it’s understandable um that China has this um lack of trust or I would say fear um in international relations theory for some of the years who have studied this I mean there are a number of different schools of thought one very important school of thought um is that other states um can become less secure when they face a powerful State even when that powerful state does not want to threaten them and under the label of What’s called the security dilemma what a state does to protect itself can appear threatening to an adversary make it fearful make it not trust the powerful State um and lead to competition between states that don’t even have political conflict of interest but simply has fear um for those of you that are interested in this you could look in um the literature that’s um under the category of defensive realism there’s an alternative view which is goes under the category of offensive realism which is basically it doesn’t matter what you do or how you act States other states will fear you if you have military capabilities improving relations um isn’t possible between powerful states and they’re always going to compete um my good friend and former colleague at the University of Chicago John mimer is CL associated with this view um if you’re interested in learning more about it I have a book I recommend it’s not at all why I agree to do this um talk but if you’re interested um I have a book called rational theory of international politics or an article in International Security in 1995 um just in terms of being fair in terms of advertising Mir shimer um has a book called The Tragedy of international politics that lays out the alternative view um before him Ken Waltz 1979 has an argument um that is often looked at as the sort of in position in between the two um okay so I hope that addressed some of the questions on trust let me

look for a minute at a couple of other questions and I’ll be right back to you um okay so there’s a question here sort of what allies are in a commitment with China um the bad news for China um is it has essentially no allies or no militarily useful allies um it is Allied um with North Korea um but North Korea does not have the um assets or capabilities that would be useful to China in defending itself in fact even though China maintains this relationship um it’s much more an economic Alliance although it would or might well come to North Korea’s defense it would depend but ch arguably North Korea is more of a danger security danger for um China than a benefit North Korea has nuclear weapons it’s gaining the capability um a missile capability right now to attack its neighbors including um Japan and South Korea and this is actually creating problems between the United States and China um because um Japan is interested in defending against North Korea’s missiles the United States is now just working at an agreement with South Korea defending against North Korea’s missiles um maybe you’ve heard about it it’s a theer missile defense system called Thad um China is arguing I think quite incorrectly but nevertheless I think believes that this sad system is actually directed against China um and not directed against North Korea so there interesting triangular relationship where a US Ally is responding to Japan um the US helping its Ally is appearing threatening into China and it really is seriously straining that relationship um similarly CH Japan is starting to want to acquire and in some cases is gaining capabilities it might be useful against North Korea systems um those are starting to look threatening to China um and I think will look more threatening in the future because they could be very accurate conventional missiles um China and Russia are in a loose um Partnership of sorts they do not have a military Alliance um that doesn’t mean that if there was a conflict that the s that Russia couldn’t come on see I grew up in the Cold War so I say often slip into saying the Soviet Union instead of um Russia showing my age here but um it’s not clear that Russia would be willing to support um China um many people think that the disagreements between um China and Russia are now are simply pragmatic and that Russia would not be willing to take this to protect Russ um to protect China um and moreover um China does not have or Russia does sorry does not have the conventional capabilities to significantly come um to China’s Aid in the area along its periphery in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea that are most important so if you look at it basically

China is not surrounded but is increasingly surrounded um on its periphery by us allies Japan South Korea um the Philippines even maybe starting to become friendly although not militarily engaged yet with um with Vietnam and then moving further um to the West um the United States has been over the last decade or more improving its um political relationship with India but this also has the potential to take on Military Dimensions um particularly as um China increases its nuclear capability but even maybe more importantly um the reach of its Navy which now is starting to reach or have some capability um into the Indian Ocean um but I just want to say that even though we hear a great deal about um the Improvement in China’s Navy it um one thing you have to keep in mind um is that the United States has literally Decades of advantages um and generations of military equipment advantages um over China in general but maybe especially in air and Naval power so China has a very long way to go um but it is woring its neighbors um okay back to your questions okay so I have a question you know do China rather um do Japan and North Kore and South Korea have the right um and I would add Andor the need um to protect against um North Korea’s missiles um and does this depend on whether North Korea is thinking of its missiles as for offense or defense um well certainly in terms of Rights by any International standards but I also think just by standard needs um sure these countries have the right in some ways they would say they have the need to react um both South Korea and Japan do fall under What’s called the US nuclear umbrella um so this means that if they were attacked um by at a minimum means if they were attacked by North Korea um the United States um would be responsible in one way or another for responding um but allies always wonder um whether a nuclear guarantor or any guarantor will is actually willing to come to their protection um so both countries have some reason to worry about whether the US deterent um whether the US would meet its commitment but more importantly they have to worry about whether North Korea would trust the us to meet it commitment whether the us whether North Korea might doubt that commitment and so um just for those reasons um doubts about whether North Korea can be deterred whether it’s a rational State they might well want to defend themselves um given that they have doubts and and reasonably have doubts and the United States also has

doubts um then yes sure it makes sense for these countries if they could actually prend them protect themselves to deploy missile defenses um missile defenses are f famously hard to make work but um in the theater context they have some L capability um it’s also possible to destroy missiles before they’re launched and highly accurate you know combination of very good surveillance capabilities and highly accurate conventional missiles can destroy targets so um the combination of um conventional counter force or conventional counter missile capabilities and missile defense um might provide some security to um countries that are threatened by by North Korea’s missiles and eventually its nuclear weapons right now we don’t think North Korea has the capability to put a nuclear weapon on one of these missiles but particularly in range of these of these countries in East Asia it will um have that capability um having said that and even if South Korea and Japan are requiring these capabilities for their own defense this doesn’t mean that China will see it that way and as I said China doesn’t see it that way so there very important concept which is the security dilemma the idea that I can’t make myself more secure without possibly um challenging the forces that you need to make yourself more secure um is an operation here it’s an operation in East Asia in a variety of ways um China is deploying conventional forces in the Navy and air capabilities to try and protect its capability um to stop the United States from um joining a war um with Taiwan United States sees that as a threat to its necessary conventional capabilities um okay I have a question do you think that China would ever side with the United States if we had another War um good question that’s a bit of a stretch for most people these days um it raises the question of what against whom that war would be um it’s not a question that’s on the table these days um because we don’t see a large war between the United States and another country in which um China could CL the weide with the United States and if I had to make one up and I’m led to make it up but one could at least imagine if the United States got in a conflict with Russia um in Russia’s far east or for that matter if Russia and Japan got Russia and Japan as you may know have um do have a territorial conflict that um dates back to the end of World War II if that conflict started and the United States got involved in that conflict um is not impossible um but I think quite unlikely that China um would join with the United States against Russia um besides that it’s hard to see um countries where that Divi where that kind of Alliance would take place but

it’s not impossible okay let me take look at there a couple longer questions here um okay okay so there’s a question here which is a good hard question about the future of the island disputes um and they ask given that um China might need to expand out of necessity due to its large population limited space um might not the United States in a certain sense want to specificate um China’s rights to these islands in the South China Sea um either by through some sort of international process through the UN um it could be through the international um court of justice um there are a couple factual points I should make first of all these islands are extremely small we’re talking about small numbers of square kilometers so these islands are not valuable in terms of um finding more space for China’s population um they’re teeny teeny teeny um most of them are not even most of them are not even don’t even have Island status um and if you’ve heard about the um Island Building that China is doing in the South China Sea it’s converting things that don’t qualify as Islands into spaces that are acres or small fractions of a square mile a few square kilometers large um so there’s no real space and population issue here um if China wants these islands it’s got it’s largely for as I understand for one of three reasons one there may be natural resources Under the Sea um in ter in terms of petroleum or in the sea in terms of fishing that if China had sort of recognized legal control to get the rights to those resources um and that’s that’s among the reasons that also some of the other claimants would like to have access second um China would get additional Maritime um control if these islands were large enough to to’s Islands then it would get um control that comes with having sovereignty control you get a mar you get Maritime control along the maritime periphery um and third and most people think most importantly China has made nationalist claims or has identified or has created part of its um nationalist narrative as including all of these islands in the South China Sea as well as the relevant islands in the SE Kaku de in the East China SE as well as almost all of the East China Sea um as defined by What’s called the n-h line um that incomplex is over 90 or close to 90% of the East China Sea um so to the extent that China wants these islands it’s for these reasons not because of its size or expansion now

um there’s a lot of dispute about um that n most most um countries don’t think that those reasons give um an indisputable or even strong right to the islands um the resources the fishing and the petroleum resources can be shared unfortunately the Nationalist complaint or nationalist claim can’t be shared and so much of what we need to negotiated is some sort of sharing of of the right some people have argue maybe the you you know maybe the all these disputes of which are very small amounts of territory could be under some sort of un protectorate and that the resources could be shared and that none of the countries would control them other people talked about joint control the very limited amount of territory that’s involved um so those are the kind of creative options that people come up with my grand bargain would call for one of those creative options um a trial however at least for the forceable future is unlikely to succeed um the Philippines took um China to um International Court over certain specific claims of in the South China seat the court recently um ruled against China on all counts much more strongly the the ruling was much stronger um than many people anticipated many countries and experts anticipated they all went against China China from the beginning said that it would not did not accept um that the court had um legal jurisdiction over these issues and said it would not accept um the and so it’s rejected the outcome um given this experience China is even less likely to be willing to accept International jurisdiction at least in the near term over any of other cases because it’s even more likely to lose um given the precedents that were set um by the recent ruling um okay um I hope that answers that question let me look um if if I haven’t answered any of the questions I’ve taken up please um send another email I think we have a couple more minutes and I will look um okay so let me answer on um there’s a question here about Hong Kong and maau um and the question is could we make a meaningful impact um toward Hong Kong I just going to answer toward Hong Kong it’s the most it’s the more important for a variety of reasons um as many of you probably know um Hong Kong was Unleashed is largely independent but under Chinese ownership on a very long term lease for 99 years when that lease came to an end um Britain ended it had to by by its legal standing um was turned over control um of Hong Kong back to China um right now there’s a 50-year understanding before which full control of Hong Kong um will go back to China Al in a certain has full control but it’s

under constraints and understandings that were negotiated with the British um the United States is not a major player um in this this has worked I mean right so um it doesn’t have many levers um the the largest levers um on China I think um are actually in World opinion how it handles the Hong Kong issue will influence other Count’s willingness to cooperate with it and most importantly there’s a very long shadow cast by Chinese policy on Hong Kong to willingness um or possible willingness in Taiwan um to eventually integrate on some set of um negotiated terms with China um if everything looked like it was going well um to the people of Taiwan and the government of Taiwan and it looked like um China was respecting long-term greater not Independence but greater governance independence of Taiwan um that might encourage um eventually that kind of negotiation with Taiwan of one country but two systems um for Taiwan where Taiwan could keep many of its um at least locally many of its um Democratic institutions in fact what I think people of Taiwan see and much World sees is that things have not gone smoothly um with Hong Kong that China has been less willing to um Grant a degree of democratic Independence to Taiwan we saw this in Uprising the umbrella uising a few years ago we see it to some extent reflected in the um recent vot in Hong Kong that put some of those demonstrators um into um as legislators minority legislators but nevertheless legislators in Hong Kong and so the real question here is um if how const strin is China um by what the precedent that it thinks it sets for others um most importantly Hong Kong I mean most importantly Taiwan but also to some extent as an indication of how liberal um China sees its future in becoming and many countries in the region might be more comfortable if their long-term expectation was that China was going to become Democratic or move toward democracy um and the extent that they see any precedent there in Taiwan that might be helpful or hurtful um I think if we’re seeing anything right now it’s on the on the hurtful side um so I don’t know do I have time for a couple more um questions or um is it time for um to wrap for Jeffrey to wrap up um somebody give me an indication do we have a few more minutes um okay one more question let me if I don’t see one pop up in a moment I’ll take one more um okay so here’s one on the economy which I’m not an expert on but I will take on um do I believe the currency manipulation is an issue with China um and if so what might be their um this us

reasonable reactions um okay I think that um I’m not an expert so here I’m going to I’m simply repeating what I understand on the issues I think that there has been concern and it is ongoing concern but I think that the expert opinion has shifted that um inan earlier years and up to the last few years that China was controlling its currency on keeping the value lower than it should be in some sort of fair market measure to help support um its trade-based growth policy however over the last few years China has let um its currency the RB um float um not not in an unrestricted way but in a less restricted way um and there’s increasingly less um Market pressure for it to actually um increase so I think the degree of Market Distortion um for a variety of reasons is smaller than it was um and that makes the currency manipulation um a somewhat smaller worry um on the policy front there it’s very very hard it’s very very tricky and costly for the United States to respond because if we start to impose sanctions or try to change manipulate our own currency at least I shouldn’t say manipulating necess it might be called better called counter manipulation by intervening in currency markets um there are a variety of trade competitions that many people think would be unfortunate um that that might set into action but my understanding is while the issue continues to be raised among experts I think that um there’s less of a problem and therefore less of um United States for to push this issue so I think I’ll stop up there I’m going to stay online and listen to to the wrap up and um I hope all of you have found this helpful thank you thank you very much um and thank you all for your participation um we’re going to hop over here to now so one thing we want to make sure that you all know is we would love you to take this survey um that allows us to make these webinars better and um fulfill your needs um so if you please go click on that top link that says thanks for joining us um the instantly link that would be extremely helpful also we will be holding a second nsda um resolution webinar on Wednesday October 12th um the policy topic has not been chosen yet it will be released on o October first sorry the Lincoln Douglas topic has not been chosen yet and it will be released on October 1st we’ll have someone here to uh help prep you on that one as well we also encourage you to bring your friends have them register solicit them to join let your debate teachers know um again we want to provide this to as many people as we can and lastly and the last link um you can go to check out other programs that we offer we offer um online debates and we

offer summer program for students and a plethora of other resources lastly but not least um there is a recording of this um I will finish this recording when we’re done and within the next week it will be posted to our website um under that um link you see to your left if you go there there’ll be a debate preparation tab that you can go click on and find this to watch it over again and help you guys get ready for your tournaments um if there’s no other questions thank you for your time and have a wonderful night and thank you again Dr Glazer