In 1760, what was to become the United States of America consisted of a small group of colonies strung out along the eastern seaboard of North America. Although they had experienced significant economic and demographic growth in the eighteenth century and had just helped Britain defeat France and take control of most of North America, they remained politically and economically dependent upon London. Yet, in the next twenty-five years, they would challenge the political control of Britain, declare independence, wage a bloody war, and lay the foundations for a trans-continental, federal republican state. In these crucial years, the colonies would be led by a new generation of politicians, men who combined practical political skills with a firm grasp of political ideas. In order to better understand these extraordinary events, the Founders who made them possible, and the new Constitution that they created, it is necessary first to understand the political ideas that influenced colonial Americans in the crucial years before the Revolution.

The Common Law and the Rights of Englishmen

The political theory of the American colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was deeply influenced by English common law and its idea of rights. In a guide for religious dissenters written in the late seventeenth century, William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, offered one of the best contemporary summaries of this common-law view of rights. According to Penn, all Englishmen had three central rights or privileges by common law: those of life, liberty, and property. For Penn, these English rights meant that every subject was “to be freed in Person & Estate from Arbitrary Violence and Oppression.” In the widely used language of the day, these rights of “Liberty and Property” were an Englishman’s “Birthright.”

In Penn’s view, the English system of government preserved liberty and limited arbitrary power by allowing the subjects to express their consent to the laws that bound them through two institutions:

“Parliaments and Juries.” “By the first,” Penn argued, “the subject has a share by his chosen Representatives in the Legislative (or Law making) Power.” Penn felt that the granting of consent through Parliament was important because it ensured that “no new Laws bind the People of England, but such as are by common consent agreed on in that great Council.”

In Penn’s view, juries were an equally important means of limiting arbitrary power. By serving on juries, Penn argued, every freeman “has a share in the Executive part of the Law, no Causes being tried, nor any man adjudged to lose [sic] Life, member or Estate, but upon the Verdict of his Peers or Equals.” For Penn, “These two grand Pillars of English Liberty” were “the Fundamental vital Privileges [sic]” of Englishmen.

The other aspect of their government that seventeenth-century Englishmen celebrated was a system that was ruled by laws and not by men. As Penn rather colorfully put it: “In France, and other Nations, the meer [sic] Will of the Prince is Law, his Word takes off any mans Head, imposeth Taxes, or seizes a mans Estate, when, how and as often as he lists; and if one be accused [sic], or but so much as suspected of any Crime, he may either presently Execute him, or banish, or Imprison him at pleasure.” By contrast, “In England,” Penn argued, “the Law is both the measure and the bound of every Subject’s Duty and Allegiance, each man having a fixed Fundamental-Right born with him, as to Freedom of his Person and Property in his Estate, which he cannot be deprived of, but either by his Consent, or some Crime, for which the Law has impos’d such a penalty or forfeiture.”

This common law view of politics understood political power as fundamentally limited by Englishmen’s rights and privileges. As a result, it held that English kings were bound to rule according to known laws and by respecting the inherent rights of their subjects. It also enshrined the concept of consent as the major means to the end of protecting these rights. According to Penn and his contemporaries, this system of government—protecting as it did the “unparallel’d
The political theory of the American colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was deeply influenced by English common law and its idea of rights.

The seriousness with which the colonists took these ideas can be seen in their strong opposition to Parliament’s attempt to tax or legislate for them without their consent in the 1760s and 1770s. After the Revolution, when the colonists formed their own governments, they wrote constitutions that included many of the legal guarantees that Englishmen had fought for in the seventeenth century as a means of limiting governmental power. As a consequence, both the state and federal constitutions typically contained bills of rights that enshrined core English legal rights as fundamental law.

**Natural Rights**

The seventeenth century witnessed a revolution in European political thought, one that was to prove profoundly influential on the political ideas of the American Founders. Beginning with the Dutch writer Hugo Grotius in the early 1600s, several important European thinkers began to construct a new understanding of political theory that argued that all men by nature had equal rights, and that governments were formed for the sole purpose of protecting these natural rights.

The leading proponent of this theory in the English-speaking world was John Locke (1632–1704). Deeply involved in the opposition to the Stuart kings in the 1670s and 1680s, Locke wrote a book on political theory to justify armed resistance to Charles II and his brother James. “To understand political power right,” Locke wrote, “and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” For Locke, the state of nature was “a state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”

Although this pregovernmental state of nature was a state of perfect freedom, Locke contended that it also lacked an impartial judge or umpire to regulate disputes among men. As a result, men in this state of nature gathered together and consented to create a government in order that their natural rights would be better secured. Locke further argued that, because it was the people who had created the government, the people had a right to resist its authority if it violated their rights. They could then join together and exercise their collective or popular sovereignty to create a new government of their own devising. This revolutionary political theory meant that ultimate political authority belonged to the people and not to the king.

This idea of natural rights became a central component of political theory in the American colonies in the eighteenth century, appearing in numerous political pamphlets, newspapers, and sermons. Its emphasis on individual freedom and government by consent combined powerfully with the older idea of common law rights to shape the political theory of the Founders. When faced with the claims of the British Parliament in the 1760s and 1770s to legislate for them without their consent, American patriots invoked both the common law and Lockean natural rights theory to argue that they had a right to resist Britain.

Thomas Jefferson offers the best example of the impact that these political ideas had on the founding. As he so eloquently argued in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

This idea of natural rights also influenced the course of political events in the crucial years after 1776. All the state governments put this new political theory into practice, basing their authority on the people, and establishing written constitutions that protected natural rights. As George Mason, the principal author of the influential Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), stated in the document’s first section: “All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” The radical implications of this insistence on equal natural rights would slowly become apparent in postrevolutionary American society as previously downtrodden groups began to invoke these ideals to challenge slavery, argue for a wider franchise, end female legal inequality, and fully separate church and state.

In 1780, under the influence of John Adams, Massachusetts created a mechanism by which the people themselves could exercise their sovereign power to constitute governments: a special convention convened solely for the purpose of writing a constitution, followed by a process of ratification. This American innovation allowed the ideas of philosophers like Locke to be put into practice. In particular, it made the people’s natural rights secure by enshrining them in a constitution which was not changeable by ordinary legislation. This method was to influence the authors of the new federal Constitution in 1787.

Religious Toleration and the Separation of Church and State

A related development in seventeenth-century European political theory was the emergence of arguments for religious toleration and the separation of church and state. As a result of the bloody religious wars between Catholics and Protestants that followed the Reformation, a few thinkers in both England and Europe argued that governments should not attempt to force individuals to conform to one form of worship. Rather, they insisted that such coercion was both unjust and dangerous. It was unjust because true faith required voluntary belief; it was dangerous because the attempts to enforce religious beliefs in Europe had led not to religious uniformity, but to civil war. These thinkers further argued that if governments ceased to enforce religious belief, the result would be civil peace and prosperity.

Once again the English philosopher John Locke played a major role in the development of these new ideas. Building on the work of earlier writers, Locke published in 1689 A Letter Concerning Toleration, in which he contended that there was a natural right of conscience that no government could infringe. As he put it: “The care of Souls cannot belong to the Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists only in outward force; but true and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion [sic] of the Mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force. Confiscation of Estate, Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that nature can have any such Efficacy as to make Men change the inward Judgment that they have formed of things.”

These ideas about the rights of conscience and religious toleration resonated powerfully in the English colonies in America. Although the Puritans in the seventeenth century had originally attempted to set up an intolerant commonwealth where unorthodox religious belief would be prohibited, dissenters like Roger Williams challenged them and argued that true faith could not be the product of coercion. Forced to flee by the Puritans, Williams established the colony of Rhode Island, which offered religious toleration to all and had no state-supported church. As the Puritan Cotton Mather sarcastically remarked,
Rhode Island contained “everything in the world but Roman Catholics and real Christians.” In addition, Maryland, founded in the 1630s, and Pennsylvania, founded in the 1680s, both provided an extraordinary degree of religious freedom by the standard of the time. In the eighteenth century, as these arguments for religious toleration spread throughout the English-speaking Protestant world, the American colonies, becoming ever more religiously pluralistic, proved particularly receptive to them. As a result, the idea that the government should not enforce religious belief had become an important element of American political theory by the late eighteenth century. After the Revolution, it was enshrined as a formal right in many of the state constitutions, as well as most famously in the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.

**Colonial Self-Government**

The political thinking of the Founders in the late eighteenth century was also deeply influenced by the long experience of colonial self-government. Since their founding in the early seventeenth century, most of the English colonies in the Americas (unlike the French and Spanish colonies) had governed themselves to a large extent in local assemblies that were modeled on the English Parliament. In these colonial assemblies they exercised their English common law right to consent to all laws that bound them. The existence of these strong local governments in each colony also explains in part the speed with which the Founders were able to create viable independent republican governments in the years after 1776. This long-standing practice of self-government also helped to create an indigenous political class in the American colonies with the requisite experience for the difficult task of nation building.

In addition to the various charters and royal instructions that governed the English colonies, Americans also wrote their own Founding documents. These settler covenants were an early type of written constitution and they provided an important model for the Founders in the late eighteenth century as they sought to craft a new constitutional system based on popular consent.

**Classical Republicanism**

Not all the intellectual influences on the Founders originated in the seventeenth century. Because many of the Founders received a classical education in colonial colleges in the eighteenth century, they were heavily influenced by the writings of the great political thinkers and historians of ancient Greece and Rome.

Antiquity shaped the Founders’ political thought in several important ways. First, it introduced them to the idea of republicanism, or government by the people. Ancient political thinkers from Aristotle to Cicero had praised republican self-government as the best political system. This classical political thought was important for the Founders as it gave them grounds to dissent from the heavily monarchical political culture of eighteenth-century England, where even the common law jurists who defended subjects’ rights against royal power believed strongly in monarchy. By reading the classics, the American Founders were introduced to an alternate political vision, one that legitimized republicanism.

The second legacy of this classical idea of republicanism was the emphasis that it put on the moral foundations of liberty. Though ancient writers believed that a republic was the best form of government, they were intensely aware of its fragility. In particular, they argued that because the people governed themselves, republics required for their very survival a high degree of civic virtue in their citizenry. Citizens had to be able to put the good of the whole (the res publica) ahead of their own private interests. If they failed to do this, the republic would fall prey to men of power and ambition, and liberty would ultimately be lost.

As a result of this need for an exceptionally virtuous citizenry, ancient writers also taught that republics had to be small. Only in a small and relatively homogeneous society, they argued, would the necessary degree of civic virtue be forthcoming. In part, it was this classical teaching about the weakness of large republics that animated the contentious debate over the proposed federal Constitution in the 1780s.

In addition to their reading of ancient authors, the Founders also encountered republican ideas in
the political theory of a group of eighteenth-century English writers called the “radical Whigs.” These writers kept alive the republican legacy of the English Civil War at a time when most Englishmen believed that their constitutional monarchy was the best form of government in the world. Crucially for the Founding, these radical Whigs combined classical republican thought with the newer Lockean ideas of natural rights and popular sovereignty. They thus became an important conduit for a modern type of republicanism to enter American political thought, one that combined the ancient concern with a virtuous citizenry and the modern insistence on the importance of individual rights.

These radical Whigs also provided the Founders with an important critique of the eighteenth-century British constitution. Instead of seeing it as the best form of government possible, the radical Whigs argued that it was both corrupt and tyrannical. In order to reform it, they called for a written constitution and a formal separation of the executive branch from the legislature. This classically inspired radical Whig constitutionalism was an important influence on the development of American republicanism in the late eighteenth century.

**Conclusion**

Drawing on all these intellectual traditions, the Founders were able to create a new kind of republicanism in America based on equal rights, consent, popular sovereignty, and the separation of church and state. Having set this broad context for the Founding, we now turn to a more detailed examination of important aspects of the Founders’ political theory, followed by detailed biographical studies of the Founders themselves.

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**Suggestions for Further Reading**


For nearly 250 years, the existence of slavery deprived African Americans of independent lives and individual liberty. It also compromised the republican dreams of white Americans, who otherwise achieved unprecedented success in the creation of political institutions and social relationships based on citizens’ equal rights and ever-expanding opportunity. Thomas Jefferson, who in 1787 described slavery as an “abomination” and predicted that it “must have an end,” had faith that “there is a superior bench reserved in heaven for those who hasten it.” He later avowed that “there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would to relieve us from this heavy reproach in any practicable way.” Although Jefferson made several proposals to curb slavery’s growth or reduce its political or economic influence, a workable plan to eradicate slavery eluded him. Others also failed to end slavery until finally, after the loss of more than 600,000 American lives in the Civil War, the United States abolished it through the 1865 ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

American slavery and American freedom took root at the same place and at the same time. In 1619—the same year that colonial Virginia’s House of Burgesses convened in Jamestown and became the New World’s first representative assembly—about 20 enslaved Africans arrived at Jamestown and were sold by Dutch slave traders. The number of slaves in Virginia remained small for several decades, however, until the first dominant labor system—indentured servitude—fell out of favor after 1670. Until then indentured servants, typically young and landless white Englishmen and Englishwomen in search of opportunity, arrived by the thousands. In exchange for passage to Virginia, they agreed to labor in planters’ tobacco fields for terms usually ranging from four to seven years. Planters normally agreed to give them, after their indentures expired, land on which they could establish their own tobacco farms. In the first few decades of settlement, as demand for the crop boomed, such arrangements usually worked in the planters’ favor. Life expectancy in Virginia was short and few servants outlasted their terms of indenture. By the mid-1600s, however, as the survival rate of indentured servants increased, more earned their freedom and began to compete with their former masters. The supply of tobacco rose more quickly than demand and, as prices decreased, tensions between planters and former servants grew.

These tensions exploded in 1676, when Nathaniel Bacon led a group composed primarily of former indentured servants in a rebellion against Virginia’s government. The rebels, upset by the reluctance of Governor William Berkeley and the gentry-dominated House of Burgesses to aid their efforts to expand onto American Indians’ lands, lashed out at both the Indians and the government. After several months the rebellion dissipated, but so, at about the same time, did the practice of voluntary servitude.

In its place developed a system of race-based slavery. With both black and white Virginians living longer, it made better economic sense to own slaves, who would never gain their freedom and compete with masters, than to rent the labor of indentured servants, who would. A few early slaves had gained their freedom, established plantations, acquired servants, and enjoyed liberties shared by white freemen, but beginning in the 1660s Virginia’s legislature passed laws banning interracial marriage; it also stripped African Americans of the rights to own property and carry guns, and it curtailed their freedom of movement. In 1650 only about 300 blacks worked Virginia’s tobacco fields, yet by 1680 there were 3,000 and, by the start of the eighteenth century, nearly 10,000.

Slavery surged not only in Virginia but also in Pennsylvania, where people abducted from Africa and their descendants harvested wheat and oats, and in South Carolina, where by the 1730s rice planters had imported slaves in such quantity that they accounted for two-thirds of the population.
The sugar-based economies of Britain’s Caribbean colonies required so much labor that, on some islands, enslaved individuals outnumbered freemen by more than ten to one. Even in the New England colonies, where staple-crop agriculture never took root, the presence of slaves was common and considered unremarkable by most.

Historian Edmund S. Morgan has suggested that the prevalence of slavery in these colonies may have, paradoxically, heightened the sensitivity of white Americans to attacks against their own freedom. Thus, during the crisis preceding the War for Independence Americans frequently cast unpopular British legislation—which taxed them without the consent of their assemblies, curtailed the expansion of their settlements, deprived them of the right to jury trials, and placed them under the watchful eyes of red-coated soldiers—as evidence of an imperial conspiracy to “enslave” them. American patriots who spoke in such terms did not imagine that they would be forced to toil in tobacco fields; instead, they feared that British officials would deny to them some of the same individual and civil rights that they had denied to enslaved African Americans. George Mason, collaborating with George Washington, warned in the Fairfax Resolves of 1774 that the British Parliament pursued a “regular, systematic plan” to “fix the shackles of slavery upon us.”

As American revolutionaries reflected on the injustice of British usurpations of their freedom and began to universalize the individual rights that they had previously tied to their status as Englishmen, they grew increasingly conscious of the inherent injustice of African-American slavery. Many remained skeptical that blacks possessed the same intellectual capabilities as whites, but few refused to count Africans as members of the human family or possessors of individual rights. When Jefferson affirmed in the Declaration of Independence “that all men are created equal,” he did not mean all white men. In fact, he attempted to turn the Declaration into a platform from which Americans would denounce the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This he blamed on Britain and its king who, Jefferson wrote, “has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its [sic] most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere.”

In 1650 only about 300 African Americans worked Virginia’s tobacco fields, yet by 1680 there were 3,000; by the start of the eighteenth century, there were nearly 10,000.

The king was wrong, he asserted, “to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold.” Delegates to the Continental Congress from South Carolina and Georgia, however, vehemently opposed the inclusion of these lines in the Declaration of Independence. Representatives of other states agreed to delete them. Thus began, at the moment of America’s birth, the practice of prioritizing American unity over black Americans’ liberty.

Pragmatism confronted principle not only on the floor of Congress but also on the plantations of many prominent revolutionaries. When Jefferson penned his stirring defense of individual liberty, he owned 200 enslaved individuals. Washington, the commander-in-chief of the Continental Army and future first president, was one of the largest slaveholders in Virginia. James Madison—who, like Jefferson and Washington, considered himself an opponent of slavery—was also a slaveholder. So was Mason, whose Virginia Declaration of Rights stands as one of the revolutionary era’s most resounding statements on behalf of human freedom. Had these revolutionaries attempted to free their slaves, they would have courted financial ruin. Alongside their landholdings, slaves constituted the principal asset against which they borrowed. The existence of slavery, moreover, precluded a free market of agricultural labor; they could never afford to pay free people—who could always move west to obtain their own farms, anyway—to till their fields.

Perhaps the most powerful objection to emancipation, however, emerged from the same set of principles that compelled the American revolutionaries to question the justice of slavery. Although Jefferson, Washington, Madison, and Mason considered human bondage a clear violation of individual rights, they trembled when they considered the ways in which emancipation might thwart their republican experiments. Not unlike many nonslaveholders, they considered especially fragile the society that they had helped to create. In the absence of aristocratic selfishness and force, revolutionary American governments relied on virtue and voluntarism. Virtue they understood as a manly trait; the word, in fact, derives from the Latin noun vir, which means “man.” They considered men to be independent and self-sufficient, made free and responsible by
habits borne of necessity. Virtuous citizens made good citizens, the Founders thought. The use of political power for the purpose of exploitation promised the virtuous little and possessed the potential to cost them much. Voluntarism was virtue unleashed: the civic-minded, selfless desire to ask little of one’s community but, because of one’s sense of permanence within it, to give much to it. The Founders, conscious of the degree to which involuntary servitude had rendered slaves dependent and given them cause to resent white society, questioned their qualifications for citizenship. It was dangerous to continue to enslave them, but perilous to emancipate them. Jefferson compared it to holding a wolf by the ears.

These conundrums seemed to preclude an easy fix. Too aware of the injustice of slavery to expect much forgiveness from slaves, in the first decades of the nineteenth century a number of Founders embarked on impractical schemes to purchase the freedom of slaves and “repatriate” them from America to Africa. In the interim, debate about the continued importation of slaves from Africa stirred delegates to the Constitutional Convention. South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney vehemently opposed prohibitions on the slave trade, arguing that the matter was best decided by individual states. The delegates compromised, agreeing that the Constitution would prohibit for twenty years any restrictions on the arrival of newly enslaved Africans. As president, Jefferson availed himself of the opportunity afforded by the Constitution when he prohibited the continued importation of Africans into America in 1808. Yet he had already failed in a 1784 attempt to halt the spread of slavery into the U.S. government’s western territory, which stretched from the Great Lakes south toward the Gulf of Mexico (the compromise Northwest Ordinance of 1787 drew the line at the Ohio River), and in his efforts to institute in Virginia a plan for gradual emancipation (similar to those that passed in Northern states, except that it provided for the education and subsequent deportation of freed African Americans). Of all the Founders, Benjamin Franklin probably took the most unequivocal public stand against involuntary servitude when, in 1790, he signed a strongly worded antislavery petition submitted to Congress by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. This, too, accomplished little.

The revolutionary spirit of the postwar decade, combined with the desire of many Upper South plantation owners to shift from labor-intensive tobacco to wheat, created opportunities to reduce the prevalence of slavery in America—especially in the North. Those opportunities not seized upon—especially in the South—would not soon return.

Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin in 1793 widened the regional divide. By rendering more efficient the processing of cotton fiber—which in the first half of the nineteenth century possessed a greater value than all other U.S. exports combined—Whitney’s machine triggered a resurgence of Southern slavery. Meanwhile, the wealth that cotton exports brought to America fueled a booming Northern industrial economy that relied on free labor and created a well-educated middle class of urban professionals and social activists. These individuals kept alive the Founders’ desire to rid America of slavery, but they also provoked the development of Southern proslavery thought. At best, Southerners of the revolutionary generation had viewed slavery as a necessary evil; by the 1830s, however, slaveholders began to describe it as a positive good. African Americans were civilized Christians, they argued, but their African ancestors were not. In addition, the argument continued, slaves benefited from the paternalistic care of masters who, unlike the Northern employers of “wage slaves,” cared for their subordinates from the cradle to the grave. This new view combined with an older critique of calls for emancipation: since slaves were the property of their masters, any attempt to force their release would be a violation of masters’ property rights.

Regional positions grew more intractable as the North and South vied for control of the West. Proposals to admit into statehood Missouri, Texas, California, Kansas, and Nebraska resulted in controversy as Northerners and Southerners sparred to maintain parity in the Senate. The 1860 election to the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, a Republican who opposed the inclusion of additional slave states, sparked secession and the Civil War.

“I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just,” Jefferson had prophetically remarked, for “his justice cannot sleep for ever.” Americans paid dearly for the sin of slavery.
members of the founding generation failed to identify moderate means to abolish the practice, and hundreds of thousands died because millions had been deprived of the ability to truly live.

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Suggestions for Further Reading


A sound understanding of the United States requires an appreciation of the historical commitment of the American people to certain fundamental liberties. High on the list of these liberties is freedom of religion. The image of brave seventeenth-century English Puritans making the difficult journey across the Atlantic to American shores in pursuit of the freedom to live according to their faith is a powerful part of the American myth. Less remembered, however, is the fact that the commonwealth established by the Puritans was as intolerant as Anglican England, from which they had fled. Indeed, the road to achieving full religious liberty in the United States was long and arduous. By the time of the writing of the United States Constitution in 1787, Americans were committed to the principle of religious tolerance (or, to use the term of the time, “toleration”) and the idea of separation of church and state, but only to a limited degree. It would be another five decades before all states granted broad religious liberty to their citizens and provided for the complete separation of church and state.

Modern ideas about freedom of religion were developed in the wake of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, which shattered the unity of Christendom and plunged Europe into political and religious conflict. Though some European states remained religiously homogeneous, either retaining the traditional faith of Roman Catholicism or adopting some brand of Protestantism, religious division within many countries led to discord and bloodshed. In England, the church established in the mid-sixteenth century by King Henry VIII (who reigned from 1509 to 1547) faced stiff resistance, first from the many Catholics who refused to abandon the faith of their ancestors, and then from the Puritans who opposed the rule of bishops and wanted to purify the church so that it included only the elect.

Henry VIII’s successors, Elizabeth I (1558–1603) and James I (1603–1625), successfully quelled opposition to the Church of England (the Anglican Church), largely through harsh persecution of dissenters. In 1642, however, England was engulfed by religious civil war, from which the Puritans emerged victorious. The Puritan Commonwealth established by Oliver Cromwell ruthlessly persecuted Anglicans and Catholics. But Puritan rule was short-lived. An Anglican monarch, Charles II, was restored to the throne in 1660. This “settlement” of the religious crisis, however, was threatened by the accession of a Catholic, James II, to the throne in 1685. Anxious Protestants conspired and invited a foreigner, William of Orange, to assume the kingship of England. William invaded England, drove James into exile, assumed the throne, and reestablished the Church of England as the national church.

In this contentious atmosphere some English political thinkers, such as John Locke, began to advocate a policy of religious toleration. Locke’s ideas reflected a key assumption of Enlightenment thought—that religious belief, like political theory, is a matter of opinion, not absolute truth. “The business of laws,” Locke wrote in his Letter on Toleration (1689), “is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods and person.” Public security was in no way dependent on a uniformity of religious belief among the citizenry. “If a Jew do not believe the New Testament to be the Word of God,” Locke stated, “he does not thereby alter anything in men’s civil rights.” Rather, intolerance led to “discord and war,” and Locke warned that “no peace and security” could be “preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails . . . that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.” Religious belief, in Locke’s view, was a matter of individual choice, a matter for society, not for government.

Locke’s views on religious liberty had a profound influence on American thinking in the next century. Other writings, however, particularly the Bible, had at least as great an impact on American political theory. Indeed, the American experiment in religious toleration began years before the publication of
Locke’s treatise, though the early history of Puritan Massachusetts Bay was hardly indicative of the course that toleration would take in America. Established by John Winthrop in 1630, Massachusetts was a repressive place where church and state were one and where religious dissent was ruthlessly stamped out. Dissenters had few options: they could be silent, suffer persecution, or leave the colony. Roger Williams, a freethinking preacher, was forced to choose this last option, leaving Massachusetts in 1636 to establish the colony of Rhode Island.

In Rhode Island, Williams instituted toleration for all people, and his new colony quickly became a refuge for persecuted groups like Quakers and Baptists. Williams’s case for toleration was at least as radical as Locke’s. Basing his arguments on the Bible, Williams insisted that the Jews, Muslims, and atheists were also deserving of religious liberty. The only “sword” to be used in fighting their opinions was scripture itself. Intolerance was an offense to God. “An enforced uniformity of religion throughout a nation or civil state,” Williams wrote in The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution (1644), “denies the principles of Christianity.” Williams argued that forced belief was not only a violation of God’s law but also an unwise policy. “Enforced uniformity (sooner or later) is the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls.”

Two years before the founding of Rhode Island, Cecil Calvert founded the colony of Maryland and proclaimed toleration for all Christians. Calvert himself was a Catholic, but he knew that the viability of his colony depended on luring enough Protestant settlers to make it an economic success. A policy of toleration, he hoped, would serve this purpose. In setting up Pennsylvania in the 1680s, William Penn, a Quaker, followed a similar course, making his colony a haven not only for his fellow coreligionists, but, like Rhode Island, a refuge for people of all religious sects.

Pennsylvania and Rhode Island would preserve uninterrupted their traditions of religious liberty, but in Maryland, freedom of religion would be curtailed for Catholics once Protestants came to power in the last decade of the seventeenth century. Still, the idea that some degree of religious liberty was a healthful policy for government became firmly rooted in America by the eighteenth century. Americans learned from the example of seventeenth-century England that religious persecution was ultimately detrimental to the political, social, and economic welfare of the nation. In America, where the Christian sects were more numerous than in England, the repercussions of religious intolerance would be especially adverse to the nation’s prospects. Americans’ devotion to religious freedom, then, was a product of necessity and experience as well as reason.

The crisis of empire during the 1760s and 1770s served to strengthen the American commitment to religious liberty. It was not only the intrusive economic measures passed by Parliament during these years that alarmed Americans. Patriot leaders also warned of the danger of the Anglican Church’s interference in American religious affairs. There was much talk that the British government would install a bishop in America who would become the instrument of tyranny. This idea that political and religious liberty went hand in hand was reflected in the New York Constitution of 1776, which explicitly connected “civil tyranny” with “spiritual oppression and intolerance.”

Nearly all the state constitutions written during the American independence movement reflected a commitment to some degree of religious liberty. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 promised that “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.” The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, authored by George Mason, proclaimed “That Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.” Mason’s ideas mirrored Locke’s belief that government should not intrude upon the concerns of society.

But many states limited religious liberty to Christians in general, or to Protestants in particular. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 decreed “That no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion . . shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State.” Similarly, the New Jersey Constitution of the same year declared that “there

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shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in this Province, in preference to another,” but promised Protestants alone full civil rights. Thanks largely to the efforts of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a Roman Catholic, Maryland’s Revolutionary Constitution was more liberal in its guarantee of religious liberty to “all persons, professing the Christian religion.”

The Protestant majority in America was indeed particularly concerned about the Catholic minority in its midst. Catholics constituted the largest non-Protestant creed in the country, and it was believed that Catholicism demanded loyalty to the pope above devotion to country. The connection between Catholicism and absolutism was deeply ingrained in the American Protestant mind and was a legacy of the Reformation, which Protestants saw as a period of liberation from the ignorance, superstition, and tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church. During the crisis with England, a wave of religious hysteria swept over American Protestants, who worried that the pope would personally lead the Catholics of Canada in a military assault on American forces. “Much more is to be dreaded from the growth of Popery in America,” patriot leader Samuel Adams asserted in 1768, “than from Stamp-Acts or any other acts destructive of men’s civil rights.” This bigotry caused Roman Catholics to become outspoken proponents of religious toleration and the separation of church and state. In a country dominated by Protestants, this was the only realistic course for them.

All thirteen states at the time of American independence, then, acknowledged to some degree in their constitutions the principle of religious liberty. Most also provided for some degree of separation of church and state. Several states went so far as to prohibit clergymen from holding state office, a restriction in the Georgia Constitution of 1777 that the Reverend John Witherspoon of New Jersey would famously protest. But few states provided for a complete separation of church and state, for it was believed that the government should give some support to religion in general. Though a substantial number of American elites in the late eighteenth century were not church-going Christians, nearly all believed in the God of the Old Testament, and all recognized the practical value of Christianity as a check on antisocial behavior. Many of the state constitutions written in the era of independence, therefore, required that government give some support to Christianity. Though the Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed that “no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law,” it also permitted the legislature to levy taxes “for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality.” Similarly, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 permitted the legislature to “lay a general and equal tax for the support of the Christian religion.”

There were, however, calls for complete religious disestablishment at the state level. In Virginia, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were two of the most prominent advocates of a strict separation of church and state. Their ideas about religious liberty were clearly influenced by John Locke and fellow Virginian George Mason. In 1785, the Virginia legislature considered a bill that would provide for public funding of Christian instruction. The measure was backed by several prominent statesmen, including Patrick Henry. But James Madison, then a member of the legislature, took the lead in opposing the bill, reminding Virginians that “torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion.” The bill was defeated, and the following year, Jefferson introduced “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” which attempted to enshrine in law the idea “that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious Worship place or Ministry whatsoever.” The bill passed with minor changes.

By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, there was a broad consensus regarding the proper relationship between the national government and religion: first, that the government ought not to give support to any religious sect; second, that the government ought not to require a religious test for office; third, that the government ought not to interfere with private religious practice; and fourth, that the government ought not to interfere with the right of the states to do as they wished in regard to religious establishment and religious liberty. These points of consensus were reflected in both the body of the United States Constitution and in the First Amendment, which was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. Article VI of the Constitution explicitly stated that
“no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.” The First Amendment declared that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

The right of the states to set their own policy in regard to religion was implicitly acknowledged in Article I of the Constitution, which stipulated that to be eligible to vote in elections for the United States House of Representatives, “the elector in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.” Several states at the time mandated a religious test as a requirement for the franchise, and the Constitution therefore tacitly approved such tests. In addition, the First Amendment’s prohibition against religious establishment applied explicitly to the national Congress alone. Indeed, it was not until after the American Civil War, in the incorporation cases, that the United States Supreme Court ruled that some of the restrictions placed on the federal government by the amendments also applied to the state governments.

By 1800, then, there was a broad consensus among Americans that religious freedom was essential to political liberty and the well-being of the nation. During the next two centuries, the definition of freedom of religion would be broadened, as states abandoned religious tests and achieved complete disestablishment and as state and federal courts ruled that various subtle forms of government encouragement of religion were unconstitutional. Shortly after the dawn of the nineteenth century, in a letter to a Baptist congregation in Danbury, Connecticut, Thomas Jefferson asserted that the First Amendment created “a wall of separation between church and state.” What Jefferson meant by this term is a subject of great debate. But there is no doubt that his words have become part of the American political creed and a rallying cry for those who seek to expand the definition of religious liberty, even to mean that religion should be removed from public life altogether.

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Suggestions for Further Reading
By the time the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, the American people had been accustomed for more than one hundred and fifty years to having most of their affairs managed first within the colonies and then in independent states. It was not surprising that the Articles of Confederation, the initial constitutional system for "The United States of America," affirmed in its first article the general "sovereignty, freedom and independence" of the states. Beyond historical precedence, the commitment to state sovereignty drew support from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau who argued that the habits and virtues needed by a self-governing people can be cultivated only in small republics. In short, history and theory seemed to be on the side of a confederation of small American republics or states.

If the American people were inclined to favor state sovereignty, they also were interested in comfortable preservation—that is, in the enjoyment of both "safety and happiness," to borrow from the Declaration of Independence. By the mid-1780s, it was clear to many Americans that state sovereignty created obstacles to comfortable preservation, not the least being the impediments to a smooth-functioning commercial system. Concerns about the effects on the country of competing fiscal and commercial policies in the different states led to the Annapolis Convention of 1786. While the delegates to this convention did not come up with a specific plan for fixing the commercial system, they petitioned the confederation congress to arrange for a constitutional convention that would reconsider the Articles of Confederation with the aim of improving interstate commerce.

James Madison, one of seven delegates chosen to represent Virginia at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, prepared a document on the history of confederacies during the months preceding the meeting. Events such as Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and disputes over the commercial use of the Potomac River, along with his study of history, convinced him that a system based on state sovereignty was destined to fail. Madison worked with other members of the Virginia delegation on a plan for a basically national, rather than confederal, system of government. In addition to provisions for separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the “Virginia Plan” would have empowered Congress "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." The Virginia Plan proposed a national government that would be legally and functionally supreme over the states.

According to Madison, only a national system would be capable of protecting the fundamental interests and rights of the American people. Other delegates at the convention disagreed. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, for example, argued that "the objects of Union . . . were few" and that "the people are more happy [sic] in small than in large States." Sherman was not alone in preferring a confederation of small republics to a national or unitary political system. Madison understood that he had to expose the weaknesses of the confederal model to save the Virginia Plan. Sherman helped him out on June 6 by conceding that some states were too small and, hence, subject to factious violence. Madison seized upon this argument. He responded that "faction & oppression" had "prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest" states, although less in the former than the latter.

The teaching for Madison was clear: large republics are more likely to provide “security for private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice,” than small republics. This argument hit home with the delegates. Madison convinced them that what they wanted most from government, that is, protection for rights or republican liberty, could
best be achieved in a national system. Small republics, he argued, were actually bad for republican liberty, being hotbeds of factious division and violence. He summed up his position bluntly: “The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in case they shd. have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.” Here was the outline of the famous defense of the large republic that appears in Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10.

In the end, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention settled on a plan that combined national and confederal elements. To quote Federalist Paper No. 39: the proposed system “in strictness” was “neither national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.” Madison’s June 6 speech, however, insured that the new “compound” republic would have a national as opposed to a confederal tilt. This innovative governmental model, what came to be called the “federal” model, represented one of America’s great contributions to the science of politics according to Madison. The model’s national elements were evident not only in the creation of separate executive and judicial departments as well as proportional representation in the House of Representatives, but in the supremacy clause that affirmed that the Constitution as well as national laws enacted under its authority would constitute the supreme law of the land. The confederal elements appeared in the provision for equal state representation in the United States Senate (a feature especially desired by the small states) and state participation in the ratification of amendments. The addition of the 10th Amendment in 1791 provided added protection for state interests (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).

The defenders of the confederal model continued their attacks on the new system during the ratification debates that followed the convention. Patrick Henry of Virginia, for example, accused the delegates to the Federal Convention of violating their authorization by proposing to establish a “consolidated” government based on the consent of the people, rather than the states. For Henry, the new constitutional system would endanger the rights and privileges of the people along with the “sovereignty” of the states. Richard Henry Lee, one of the Anti-Federalists, shared Henry’s fear that a large republic would not be hospitable to liberty and natural rights. Like many other opponents of the Constitution, Lee also argued that republican liberty can be preserved only by a virtuous citizenry and that only small republics are capable of nurturing civic and moral virtues.

The fact that the document that issued from the Federal Convention did not include a bill of rights seemed to lend support to the charge by Patrick Henry and others that the proposed governmental system would promote neither the happiness nor the liberty of the people. In fact, several delegates to the convention, including George Mason of Virginia and Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts, were sufficiently troubled by the absence of a bill of rights that they departed without adding their signatures to the document. Gerry also worried that the new government would not adequately represent the people and that its powers were not well defined. When it was clear that the opponents of the plan would not accept the argument that the framework set out by the delegates provided for a limited government of enumerated powers that would be incapable of emasculating natural rights and liberties, an agreement was reached during the ratification period to add amendments that would guarantee, among other things, freedom of speech and religion, trial by one’s peers, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The federal system or compound republic crafted by the Framers was an ingenious response to the demand for both effective or competent government on the one side, and rights-sensitive government on the other. The decision to divide power among (federalism) and within (checks and balances) several governments positioned the American people to enjoy the benefits of a large republic (e.g., strong defense against foreign encroachments, national system of commerce, etc.) while still retaining significant control over their day-to-day affairs within the states. The states, and not the national government, were entrusted with the “police powers,” that is, the
authority to protect the health, morals, safety and welfare of the people. It is worth noting that Madison was quite content to entrust the police powers to the states—he never desired that the United States have a unitary system of government.

Ratification of the Constitution in 1791 hardly put an end to the debate between the advocates of state sovereignty or small republicanism and the proponents of national sovereignty and the large republic. The concerns of James Madison and Patrick Henry, for example, are never far from the surface of contemporary debates about the power of the federal government to impose regulations on the states under the Constitution’s commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. There is considerable evidence, however, that the tension between these positions not only adds vitality to the constitutional system, but has been critically important to the advancement of both national security and equality in the enjoyment of fundamental rights. The federal arrangement that was crafted by the delegates at the Federal Convention of 1787 has long been recognized as one of the principal models of a modern democratic system of government.

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Suggestions for Further Reading

Although the modern United States is the preeminent example of a nation dedicated to free enterprise and commercial activity, the relationship between republican government and commerce was one of the central problems that confronted the Founders in the late eighteenth century. In order to understand the Founders' attitudes toward commerce, we need to understand both the role that commercial activity played in the American colonies in the century before the Revolution, as well as the important arguments about the legitimacy of commercial societies that animated English and European thinkers in the two centuries before the American Founding.

The American colonies originated in part as commercial enterprises. From the first settlements in the early seventeenth century until the eve of the Revolution, British and European settlers saw America as a place where they could come and make a better life for themselves. By the mid-eighteenth century, the British colonies in America were prosperous places heavily engaged in production and trade. Although the population was still overwhelmingly rural, colonial farmers were increasingly engaged in commercial agriculture. In all regions, they produced more than was needed for subsistence, trading their surplus with other colonies as well as engaging in a growing transatlantic trade with Britain and Europe. The Southern colonies produced valuable staple crops for export (tobacco, rice, indigo, wheat); farmers in the Middle colonies had a flourishing agricultural economy which was also involved in trade with the wider world; and, by the eighteenth century, the New England colonies were building ships, selling timber, and trading produce with the British Caribbean sugar islands. As a result of these extensive Atlantic trading networks, all of the colonial economies grew enormously in the eighteenth century. In addition, the main colonial port cities—Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charles Town (Charleston)—grew in size and importance. This burgeoning commercial society also had a large merchant class, with powerful and wealthy men like John Hancock in Boston involved in far-flung commercial ventures.

The pre-Revolutionary American colonies were also consumer societies that eagerly used their growing wealth to purchase goods from all over the world. And, as the Revolution approached, a growing number of white settlers not included in the political and economic elite were increasingly able to participate in this consumerism. Indeed, such was the widespread prosperity of these colonies that many modern historians have referred to them as the first middle class societies in the world.

All of this commercial activity, however, had a dark side. The Atlantic trade that the colonists engaged in with such profit was founded in part on the movement of African slaves to the New World. Once there, these slaves were responsible for producing the lucrative staple crops that the colonies sold to England and Europe in exchange for manufactured goods. In addition, the ever-expanding agricultural economy of the colonies depended on the removal of the Native American population from their lands.

Several strands of thought provided intellectual justification for the increasingly commercial world of the eighteenth-century British Atlantic. The long tradition of English common law stressed the importance of property rights, which it saw as central to liberty, and which it protected from arbitrary seizure by preventing governments from taking property without the subject's consent. By stressing the sanctity of person and property, the English common law provided a legal infrastructure which supported a commercial society.

Seventeenth-century English Puritanism also provided a justification of commercial activity. According to Puritanism, God wanted people to work hard and prosper. To do so was a sign that you were one of the “elect,” destined to be “saved”
and not “damned.” This Puritan work ethic remained a powerful force in American life well past the Revolution.

The political theory of the English writer John Locke (1632–1704), and in particular his ideas about a natural right to liberty and property, also provided justification for a commercial society. Like the common law, it placed a value on the liberty of the person, including the liberty to engage in production and trade. In addition, Locke offered an elaborate theoretical defense of an individual’s right to property. According to Locke, individuals were not given property rights by the state; rather, they generated a right to private property by their own labor. Locke defended commercial societies based on private property by arguing that they produced greater wealth for all than did those societies which eschewed private property and exchange. By making this case, Locke helped to legitimize commercial activity in the face of age-old denunciations that it was sinful. Building on these seventeenth-century ideas, English people on both sides of the Atlantic in the eighteenth century increasingly viewed themselves as free, Protestant, and deeply commercial.

By the time of the Revolution, the American Founders had also encountered the ideas of an influential group of eighteenth-century Enlightenment writers who offered a sophisticated defense of commercial societies. The French writer Montesquieu (1689–1755) argued that commerce “cures destructive prejudices” by fostering peaceful trade among peoples rather than war. Many Scottish writers in the eighteenth century made a similar defense of commerce. They argued that commercial societies constituted the highest stage of civilization and were the most conducive to human well-being, fostering political and religious liberty, peaceful relations among nations, higher standards of living, science, and the arts. The moral philosopher and economist Adam Smith (1723–1790), writing in the same year as the American Revolution, argued that self-interest was beneficent, and that those who sought private wealth were simultaneously benefiting society. All of these thinkers celebrated the modern commercial world in which they lived as superior to previous ages which, they argued, were characterized by feudal and aristocratic inequality, constant warfare, and religious fanaticism.

However, the ideas that influenced the Founders were not all supportive of commerce. Christianity, even in its Puritan form, could be used to denounce moneymaking. In New England in the seventeenth century, the merchant Robert Keayne was put on trial on charges of usury. In the years after independence, this Christian critique combined in the Founders’ thought with that of the republican thinkers of Greece and Rome who shared a similar skepticism about commerce. They argued that a society dedicated to commerce and self-interest would produce citizens overly concerned with private matters and insufficiently attentive to the public good. These classical republican thinkers were particularly concerned about the political effects of luxury, worrying that liberty would be lost if people were too focused on the pursuit of material gain. To the extent that republican thinkers defended property rights, they did so primarily as a means to the end of ensuring that there was an independent citizenry capable of acting for the public good. These classical ideas about the dangers of commerce to republican government influenced the Founders in the late eighteenth century. In particular, the ideas led some of them to be suspicious of the new institutions of commercial banking and public and private debt that supported the eighteenth-century commercial world.

The Revolution initially fostered these anticommmercial sentiments in the colonial populace. In their attempts to harm the British economy, the colonies organized widespread nonimportation agreements in the 1760s and 1770s. Drawing on both the Christian and the classical republican critique of commerce, some colonists argued that this withdrawal from trade would also create a more virtuous citizenry, one less likely to succumb to luxury and self-interest. Writing his influential “Thoughts on Government” in 1776, a guide for lawmakers in the newly independent republican state governments, John Adams openly called for legal restrictions on consumption (called “sumptuary laws” in the eighteenth century), arguing that “the happiness of the people might be greatly promoted by them.”

Following the Revolution, the experience of both the new state governments and that of the Continental Congress operating under the Articles of Confederation brought these questions about
in the knowledge that they would be able to reap the benefits of their labor.

Although the new Constitution laid the groundwork for an extended commercial republic, it did not end the debates among the Founders over the legitimacy of commerce. In the 1790s, the Federalists argued for a government-led program of commercial expansion, involving investments in infrastructure as well as the creation of a national banking system. However, the Democratic-Republican Party under Thomas Jefferson was much more divided on the merits of commercial republicanism. One strand of Jeffersonian thought was skeptical of extensive commercial activity, preferring instead a society of independent yeoman farmers whose landed status would give them a secure material base for republican citizenship. In making this argument, the Jeffersonians echoed the republican thinkers of antiquity who valued landed property over commercial property because it alone enabled the virtuous citizen to act in the public interest. This aspect of Jeffersonian thought was also skeptical of manufacturing and wage labor, fearing that a populace engaged in such pursuits would not be able to obtain the independence required of republican citizens. Finally, Jeffersonians were very concerned about the modern institutions of banking and public and private debt, fearing that they would enable powerful men to undermine republican government by setting up an aristocracy of money.

However, Jeffersonian thought also had a strong laissez-faire element, one that became increasingly important as the eighteenth century came to a close. Although still preferring commercial agriculture over manufacturing, Jeffersonians were ardently in favor of free labor, free trade, and free markets. On this view, commerce was a liberating, even equalizing force, allowing the common people to benefit from the fruits of their own labor. In addition, this Jeffersonian policy of laissez-faire was very skeptical of the Federalist plans for extensive state-directed commerce, preferring instead to let individuals make their own economic decisions. This element of the Jeffersonian attitude toward commerce expressed the powerful desire of the American populace for material improvement, a desire which had deep roots in the colonial past.
Jefferson’s election in 1800 did not end these debates about the propriety of commercial activity. Most Americans agreed that republican liberty included the right to own property and to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor. However, as Jefferson’s “empire of liberty” expanded west, this vision of free men and free labor clashed with the institution of slavery as it became an increasingly profitable form of commercial activity, and one that was sometimes defended as an expression of the American commitment to private property. Along with the relationship between slavery and free labor, the question of the place of manufacturing in a republican society, the role of banks, the issue of free trade, and the desirability of state intervention in the economy remained pressing questions in the increasingly commercial United States well into the nineteenth century.

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Suggestions for Further Reading


